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Abstract 
To model the telecommunications infrastructure and its role and robustness to 
shocks, we must characterize the business and engineering of telecommunications 
systems in the year 2003 and beyond. By analogy to environmental systems 
modeling, we seek to develop a “conceptual model” for telecommunications. 
Here, the conceptual model is a list of high-level assumptions consistent with the 
economic and engineering architectures of telecommunications suppliers and 
customers, both today and in the near future. We describe the present engineering 
architectures of the most popular service offerings, and describe the supplier 
markets in some detail. We also develop a characterization of the customer base 
for telecommunications services and project its likely response to disruptions in 
service, base-lining such conjectures against observed behaviors during 9/11. 
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Caveat 
Telecommunications over the last 20 years has experienced more technology and 
market change than, say, aviation has in 40 years or the railroads in 100 years. Nuclear 
technologies over the last 30 years seem positively moribund compared to the rate of 
change in information technologies. Water resources and many other technologies have 
never experienced the same absolute amount or rate of change. Only computer 
technologies have experienced an equivalent rate of change in the last 50 years.  Noting 
that, it is easy to find predictions from computer technology leaders in the 1960s and 
1970s that seem quaint or laughable today. This should warn any modeler away from an 
uncritical reading of this or any other document that purports to accurately characterize 
future (and even present) states of such a fast-changing technology, much less customer 
response to these technologies. There are future equilibrium states, e.g., open-spectrum 
proposals, that may eventually lead to some maturation and relative stability in 
telecommunications, but how and when we will arrive at such states is more speculation 
than science. The seersucker hypothesis has not been disproved by this study, that 
hypothesis being that for every seer, there is a sucker. 
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A Year 2003 Conceptual Model for the 
U.S. Telecommunications Infrastructure 
Introduction 
In the early stages of developing CommAspen, a new economics model of 
infrastructure interdependency that focuses on communications, we sought to gain a 
greater understanding of the key aspects of the telecommunications industry. We looked 
at the structure of the industry, how it is regulated, who its major equipment suppliers 
are, what pricing models it employs, what architectures are in use or anticipated, and how 
telecommunications is interdependent with other infrastructures. Based on this research, 
we then proposed a set of categories of telecommunications agents for the model and 
identified characteristics of the services these types of agents could provide. As 
disruption of telecommunications services is of prime importance in developing a 
realistic model of infrastructure interdependency, we also postulated the kinds of 
behaviors that might be expected during and after a telecommunications outage by both 
consumers of telecommunications services and providers of these services.  
We note that it is easier to develop conceptual models in telecommunications over 
environmental systems in the sense that most telecommunications engineering processes 
are man-made and thus theoretically known, although often company-proprietary. Also, 
customers explicitly opt into many telecommunications services, and the consequences of 
telecommunications failures do not involve projecting the health affects of low-level 
contamination. 
Our work on defining the behavioral characteristics of telecommunications agents for 
CommAspen was interrupted by the events of September 11, 2001. However, through 
press accounts post-9/11, we were able to collect evidence about actual responses to 
telecommunications outages by both consumers and providers of telecommunications 
services. We compared these actual responses to those predicted pre-9/11, as a means of 
validating our initial preconceptions of agent behaviors. 
This report describes the research and analysis we performed in the development of 
the CommAspen model. For the initial version of CommAspen, we implemented a few of 
the agent behaviors, but by no means all. This report serves as a guide for the further 
development of the telecommunications infrastructure in CommAspen. 
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Overview of the Telecommunications Industry 
This section of the report was initially a Power Point presentation. We have used 
many of the viewgraphs from that presentation and have also added textual descriptions 
to give a more comprehensive picture of the industry than would be available in the 
viewgraphs alone. Please note that much of the data in this section covers the late 1990s 
and very early 2000s and may thus be somewhat outdated in the year that this report is 
being published, 2003.  
Structure of the Industry and Revenues 
The telecommunications industry consists mainly of six types of service providers: 
local exchange carriers (LECs), long distance/international carriers, cellular carriers, 
cable providers, Internet service providers (ISPs), and satellite broadcast and paging 
providers. A brief description of these provider types follows. 
• LECs – Providers of local wireline telecommunications service, e.g., Qwest. More 
formally, LECs were providers of intraLATA services, where LATA (local access 
and transport area) is a delineation of a local area, sort of like a county.   
• Long distance/international carriers – Long-distance refers to domestic (intraUS) 
carriers of voice and data services outside of a LATA area, e.g., AT&T, MCI, Sprint. 
International carriers provide services outside the United States—the incumbent long-
distance carriers normally provide these services. A long-distance phone call may use 
two LEC networks and one long-distance (or IXC IntereXchange Carrier) network. 
• Cellular carriers – Providers of (primarily voice) cellular service, which is a wireless 
telephony scheme using fixed antennae covering a relatively small area, and a scheme 
for tracking a call as it moves across regions/cells serviced by differing antennae, 
e.g., Sprint, AT&T, Nextel, T-Mobile, Cingular, Verizon. 
• Cable providers – Providers of broadcast cable services in a metropolitan area and 
increasingly broadband access to the Internet backbone, e.g., Comcast. 
• ISPs – Providers of Internet services that supply a bridge between the LEC and the 
Internet backbone, e.g., America Online (AOL), Earthlink. 
• Satellite broadcast and paging providers – Providers of satellite broadcast and paging 
services. The distinction between these providers and any of the ones above are that 
the transmissions are broadcast in nature, i.e., one-way, except for a tiny amount of 
satellite telephone traffic. 
From 1999–2000, the annual revenues from telecommunications in the United States 
was approximately $333 billon dollars. Of this amount, the largest revenues were by 
LECs, accounting for $111 billion, and the smallest were by direct broadcast satellite 
(DBS), accounting for $8 billion. Figure 1 shows the distribution of revenues by provider 
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types during this period. This figure was compiled from a variety of sources, mainly 
Reference 1.  
Annual revenues from 
communications (billion $)
111
34
55
20
50
37
18 8
Local
Intrastate toll
Interstate toll
International
Wireless
Cable
ISP
DBS
 
 
Figure 1. Annual revenues in the telecommunications industry in the 
United States 1999–2000. 
According to Reference 2, the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA), the 
telecommunications industry accounted for 5.6% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 
the United States in 1999. Looking back over the 1990s, in fact, more than 40% of the 
economic growth in the United States from 1995 through 1996 was attributed to the 
information technology (IT) sector, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. economic growth in IT, 1992–1998. Source: 
Telecommunications Industry Association [2]. 
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Expenditures on telecommunications equipment showed steady and large increases 
annually from 1995 to 1999 [2], as shown in Figure 3. These expenditures covered, for 
example, purchases of hardware and/or software for items like switches, multiplexers, 
fiber-optic cables, and operations support systems software. The expenditures did not 
include personal computers (PCs), noncarrier routers, or local area network (LAN) 
equipment, which would fall under data communications. The line between telecom 
equipment and data communications equipment is becoming increasingly blurred. 
 
 
Figure 3. U.S. spending on telecommunications equipment, 
1995–1999. Source: Telecommunications Industry 
Association [2]. 
Local Exchange Carriers 
LECs provide local telephone service to subscribers. There are two types of LECS: 
the Regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs), also called incumbent LECs, and the 
competitive LECS, called CLECS. In mid-2000, there were approximately 192 million 
local telephone phone lines in the United States. The distribution across carriers, 
however, was dominated by the Baby Bells. Within their respective regions, the Baby 
Bells controlled 93.3% of the local phone lines. The remaining penetration by the CLECs 
(6.7%) varied considerably by state. Figure 4 shows the number of telephone lines, or 
local loops, provided by the major RBOC carriers (Verizon, SBC, Bell South, and Qwest) 
and the CLECS at the end of 1999 [1]. 
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Figure 4. Local telephone lines by major RBOCs and CLECs 
as of December 31, 1999. Compiled from Table 8.3 [1]. 
Long-Distance/International Carriers 
In the long-distance market, the transition to competition has been a slow process. 
According to the Federal Communications Commission [1], AT&T had a virtual 
monopoly on long-distance service in the United States until the 1970s. But by 2000, 
more than 700 companies offered long-distance service. As shown in Figure 5, three of 
these companies (AT&T, MCI/Worldcom, and Sprint) generated more than 70% of the 
toll revenues. Thirty percent of the revenues were thus generated by smaller carriers, 
none of which had more than 2% market share.  
Toll revenue 
(billion $)
40
23
10
25 AT&T
MCI
Sprint
All other
 
Figure 5. Toll revenues by U.S. long-distance carriers in 
1999. Compiled from Table 10.1 [1]. 
Cellular Carriers 
From the early 1980s through 2000, the growth in wireless communications 
(generally synonymous with cellular during this period) was dramatic. In 1984, there 
were 92,000 wireless subscribers in the United States. By June 2000, there were over 97 
Local loops
(millions)
62
59
25
17
22 Verizon
SBC
BellSouth
Qwest
Non-RBOC
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million U.S. wireless subscribers [1], representing approximately 30% market 
penetration. Compiled from a number of annual reports by one of the authors of this 
report during the 1999–2000 time frame, Figure 6 shows the numbers of subscribers for 
the major cellular carriers. As in the long-distance market, a few carriers dominated. 
Cellular subscribers 
(millions)
28
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10 7
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Figure 6. Number of cellular subscribers during the 1999-2000 
time frame. 
Cable Providers 
The cable industry is a significant player in the overall telecommunications industry. 
According to the National Cable and Telecommunications Association, in 2001 there 
were approximately 10,000 cable systems in the United States, carrying the programming 
of more than 200 different cable networks. The employee base for the industry (130,000 
employees) [3] was a significant fraction of the overall telecommunications industry 
(roughly 180,000 for cellular services and 900,000 for regular wireline services [1 – 
Table 5.1]. Further, there were approximately 69.5 million basic cable subscribers out of 
approximately 102 million TV households [3]. As shown in Figure 7, five major 
companies that have 60% of the market share dominated the industry in mid-2001 [4]; 
however, this consolidation is much less than what is found in either the IXC market or 
the LEC market. 
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Figure 7. Cable subscribers for top providers in 
mid-2001. Source: Multichannel News, extracted 
from Reference 4. 
Internet Service Providers 
The ISP market is less than 10 years old and has not undergone the same degree of 
contraction and consolidation as cable, nor has it inherited market share after the 
divestiture of AT&T. It is not under any federal regulatory requirements, so there is no 
equivalent to the Common Carrier bureau to compile regular statistics on ISPs. The rapid 
growth and early sign of market consolidation, combined with the lack of an authority 
with a mission to collect such data, make even a survey of existing ISPs problematic. The 
ISP market is unstable because it requires little actual physical plant to be an ISP, as 
compared to being a telecommunications carrier. 
In 2000, there were an estimated 8,100 worldwide ISPs [5]. Figure 8 shows the top 
ISPs in the United States with their associated on-line accounts as of early 2001 [6]. Note 
that all ISP subscriber data should be taken with a grain of salt since there is no federal 
reporting requirement, and every motivation for corporate sources to inflate numbers.  
Online accounts 
(millions)
22
5
5
4
4
3 3 3
18.7
AOL
MSN
EarthLink
Juno
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Figure 8. ISP On-line accounts in late 2000/early 2001. 
Compiled from data available on ISP Planet [6]. 
Cable Subscribers (in millions) 
AT&T Broadband  15.3 
Time Warner Cable  12.8 
ComCast  7.7 
Charter Com.  6.3 
Cox Com.  6.1 
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About wireless local-area-network (WLAN) technologies. The rapid availability of 
public WLAN technologies has led to an informal development of a network of free or 
pay-by-the-hour wireless ISPs. WLAN technologies, often called Wi-Fi today, generally 
cover anything that falls under the IEEE 802.11 standards for wireless broadcasting of 
data in the 2.4 or 5 GHz band over the public spectrum. These technologies are referred 
to as 802.11x, since the standards are indexed that way (802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g, etc.). 
There is a single “access point” and one or several basic service sets, like PCs, that home 
off that point. The access point is also connected to the wireline network in some way, 
usually a broadband connection to the Internet via an ISP. While there are other wireless 
data options, these options are generally special-purpose and more limited in deployment 
[7]. Although it is unknown at this time what ultimate impact WLAN technologies will 
have, their exponential growth makes it important that we note them here 
Because the spectrum is free, anyone with a PC and a few hundred dollars can be a 
Wi-Fi service provider. In 2001, as reported in Reference 8, approximately $1.5 billion 
was spent on equipment for Wi-Fi technologies. In the two basic categories of the Wi-Fi 
market (home and enterprise) in 2001, important vendors with their market share were as 
follows: 
• SOHO/home: LinkSys (22.1%), Buffalo (10.2%), D-Link (10%) 
• Enterprise: Cisco (35.4%), Agere (18.4%), Symbol (13%) 
Importantly, WiFi is inherently more vulnerable than other kinds of telecommunications 
services because there is no physical requirement for a connection, and anyone can 
“sniff” the transmitted data to detect whatever security scheme is in place [9]. A 
comparison of WiFi and other mobile technologies can be found in Reference 10. 
Satellite and Paging 
In 2001, there were 15.5 million subscribers of DBS (direct broadcast satellite) TV in 
the United States [3]. Direct TV and EchoStar were the two competing satellite 
broadcasters [11]. Compared to broadcast customers, however, the number of 
telecommunications customers of satellite is very small. As reported in Reference 12, 
Globalstar, the most widely used satellite phone service, had 77,000 subscribers 
worldwide in late 2002. 
At year-end 2000, an estimated 42 million customers subscribed to basic numeric and 
alphanumeric paging services [13]. The two leading paging companies were Arch 
Wireless, with nearly 12 million messaging units, and Metrocall, with approximately 8.2 
million units. Both companies had recently acquired other paging companies, which 
boosted their customer bases [13,14]. Other major pager suppliers included Verizon 
Wireless, Bell South Wireless Data, Skytel (a division of MCI/Worldcom), and Motien 
[13]. 
You can do more with cellular, and for lower cost, than satellite for almost all paging 
applications, especially now that nationwide deployment of cellular data technologies is 
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being aggressively pursued. And a nationwide WiFi may eventually displace both 
technologies. The satellite paging market is in significant decline [13,15,16].  
Industry Regulation of Service Providers 
Five basic principles, or requirements, inform the way the telecommunications 
industry is regulated, as listed in Figure 9 and briefly discussed below. 
 
Figure 9. Basic principles of industry regulation. 
First, LECs must provide lifeline service for low-income customers to support public 
health and safety.  
Second, there is a vision of “universal service” that ensures that rural and poor people 
have equitable access to even nonlifeline services. This vision has been extended to 
accessing the Internet [17] but has not been a dominant requirement for cellular services, 
or value-added services such as availability of ultrahigh reliability. For a historical 
context of universal service, see Reference 17. 
Third, both wireline and cellular are viewed as a natural monopoly. Because it is so 
hard to build a new wireline network, or acquire scarce spectrum for wireless, there is a 
natural monopoly created by these barriers to entry, allowing incumbent carriers to 
extract monopoly rents beyond a “fair rate of return.” As a result, the federal government, 
as well as the states, has regulated rates of return for services that have this monopoly 
flavor and has also required incumbents to provide access to their network to competitors 
at a fair price [18,19,20]. 
Fourth, principles related to ROW and the spectrum are also embedded in regulation 
of the telecommunications industry. Regarding ROW, which is the real estate portion of 
the telecommunications network for wireline, there should be no local burdening of 
interstate commerce. This means that a state cannot charge a toll for traffic that goes 
through the state and cannot put unreasonable restrictions on networks that carry 
• “Lifeline” service 
• Vision of “universal service” 
• Wireline and cellular viewed as a natural 
monopoly 
• Right-of-way (ROW) and spectrum concerns 
• National security, law enforcement and privacy 
concerns 
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interstate traffic. The federal government can preempt the states based upon this 
constitutional requirement. In addition, by the law of eminent domain the government 
can claim land for such things as landlines and antennae if the land is for the public good 
and the owner is fairly compensated. The public good is a finite common resource that 
must be shared among competing interests. Similarly, the electromagnetic spectrum is 
treated as a public good, with equitable auctions conducted of the spectrum. There is an 
issue of whether and how property rights can be bestowed on such a shared resource [21]. 
The auctioning of such spectrum is one approach to spectrum management, but it has 
been problematic and controversial. Issues such as fairness, financial solvency, and the 
purchase of spectrum to prevent competitive offerings instead of fostering them must be 
dealt with. 
And fifth, concerns of national security, law enforcement, and privacy are intertwined 
with regulation of the telecommunications industry. Such concerns are tangential to any 
modeling concerns the CommAspen group would have in its study of the 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
Equipment Suppliers in Telecommunications 
Equipment companies in the telecommunications industry sell a variety of equipment 
including, for example, switches and associated software, cell towers and antennae, 
transmission cabling, line-terminating equipment, multiplexers, routers and associated 
software, various outside plant equipment, operations support software (OSS), and 
customer-premises equipment (CPE) like telephone sets but not the computers. Some 
companies sell support services for their equipment as well. The largest suppliers of 
telecommunications equipment in 2001 are listed in Figure 10. The companies are listed 
vaguely in order of declining sales revenue, as compiled by one of the authors mainly 
from Reference 22; where information was not available on that Web site, it was obtained 
from other corporate Web sites. Those companies shown in italics are not located in the 
United States.  
 
 Figure 10. Largest telecommunications equipment suppliers in 2001. 
• Motorola
• HP
• Lucent
• Seimens
• Alcatel
• Ericsson
• Nokia
• Nortel
• Cisco
• Sun
• 3Com
• Cabletron
• Fujitsu
• Tellabs
• ADC Communications
• Qualcomm
• Harris
• Siebel Systems
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Figure 11 shows a distribution of equipment expenditures in 1999 [2]. This figure 
gives some sense of the relative percentages spent on various types of equipment. In 
1999, during the dot-com boom, ISPs and Internet-related expenses made up roughly 
20% of all equipment purchases—a category that was almost nonexistent 5–10 years 
earlier. We were still heavily in the long-haul fiber-optics buildout, so fiber equipment 
was still 10% of equipment purchases.  
 
Figure 11. Investment in equipment in third quarter 1999. 
Source: Telecommunications Industry Association [2]. 
The “largest” equipment supplier is not necessarily the most critical. Relatively small 
(from a revenue standpoint) providers can provide critical components to 
telecommunications systems and are just as important from a reliability and robustness 
standpoint as the larger vendors. For example, in 1998, a telephone outage occurred on 
the East Coast, throwing businesses in East Cost cities in turmoil. The source of the 
outage was a breakdown in equipment by Illuminet, a small carrier that provided services 
to phone company networks [23,24]. Verizon purchased Illuminet in 2001. 
In addition, though none of the wholesale fiber shops made the list of largest 
equipment suppliers presented in Figure 11, these businesses are obviously critical. Small 
companies can also provide OSSs, power gear (the electrical equipment providing power 
to telecommunications equipment), leased data-center space (office space that meets 
certain power, fiber access, alternating current [AC], and other requirements to allow 
telecommunications equipment to be placed there and to service customers in a cost-
effective and reliable fashion.  
The notion of largest equipment supplier can also extend to the very smallest of 
companies, which is no company at all. An example is Apache, which is open-source 
freeware that runs on most Web servers.  
 22
Market Structure and Pricing 
The telecommunications industry is evolving into wholesale and retail markets. The 
wholesale market consists of sales of (1) raw bandwidth to retail service resellers who 
use this bandwidth to develop retail value-added services, (2) other “unbundled” network 
components to competitors necessary to develop retail services (the offering of which is 
mandated by the federal government) and (3) network components sold directly to large 
end-users to build their own networks. The retail market consists of the retail selling of 
value-added services built with wholesale components. 
A number of models are discussed below related to the pricing of telecommunications 
services. The structure of pricing is important for addressing the kinds of economic 
models for telecommunications that the CommAspen program should consider in their 
overall models of the U.S. economy. More specifically, of interest is the difference 
between economic impacts due to failure of components versus impacts due to pricing 
fluctuations. Or alternatively, the sort of shocks caused by economic failures of critical 
small players will result in shocks to the economic system that will be observed and 
modeled in CommAspen through changes in the prices of services. 
Pricing Models 
A rich set of pricing models have been successfully employed in telecommunications: 
• flat monthly rate for unlimited use of fixed bandwidth. An example of this 
model is “rental” of a T1 line. 
• subsidies, tariffs, but no business/residential X-subsidies. The reason the 
business community was so strongly in favor of the AT&T breakup was the 
policy of subsidizing low residential rates with higher business rates. This 
cross-subsidization policy has been eroded over the years, but nowhere more 
strongly or significantly than in these flat-rate services. 
• bandwidth-sensitive (per kb/s). This model covers usage-based pricing for 
frame relay services (also called frame relay SVCs) and for long-distance 
plain old telephone service (POTS) and cellular in the sense that if one is not 
using the service, 0 kb/s is being used and one is therefore not charged. Frame 
relay rates are still sensitive to the committed information rate (CIR), which is 
the minimum bandwidth the carrier guarantees will be available to the user, so 
it is something like a fixed bandwidth charge as well. 
• distance-sensitive (per mile, calling area). Rates in this pricing model are based 
on per-mile and calling-area criteria. An example of the per-mile criterion is 
the charge for T3 lines. Examples of differential charges based on 
geographical area are intraLATA-versus-interLATA POTS (e.g., a call within 
Albuquerque versus a call from Albuquerque to Los Alamos), and domestic-
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versus-international POTS (e.g., a call from Albuquerque to somewhere in the 
United States versus a call from Albuquerque to Paris). 
• time-sensitive. The long-distance bill per call is an example of this usage-based 
pricing model, where there is a per-minute change. 
• enhanced value-added services. An example of a value-added service is Caller 
ID, where there is a monthly charge. Custom-contracted telecommunications 
services can include financial penalties for missing some target performance 
level. This approach is the opposite of enhanced value-added costing more in 
that degraded services cost less after financial penalties are assessed. 
 
Performance-Based Pricing Model 
What is more interesting in terms of the efficiency of the telecommunications 
industry in meeting national economic and security needs than the pricing models 
currently in place is a pricing model based on performance. Historically, performance 
guarantees have had no financial meaning, though regulators might get into the act when 
service degraded too much. In the main, telecommunications services have been based on 
a “best effort” criterion, and customers have had very limited options, if any, for financial 
recovery. If the telecommunications company exercised its best effort in meeting your 
needs, the company is not legally liable to compensate you for lost revenue—only for not 
billing you for the hours of service not provided. For example, if you were using your 
ISP to sell something, and the ISP service went out for some reason, you cannot sue your 
ISP for your lost revenues. You can only sue for any billing for the period your service 
was out, but you cannot sue your ISP for the transition costs to your business.   
Now, there are competitive options in many cases. For example, in the situation 
described above, you could go to another vendor for your Internet service. So there is a 
financial meaning to missing performance targets in terms of long-term revenues, but 
only if there are competitive options available. There may not be competitive options for 
services provided by RBOCs like Qwest. Despite having more competitive options, 
financial incentives are still too weak to improve performance. 
To address performance issues, some sort of instrument is needed that would allow, 
or even force, the incumbents to offer such performance guarantees, with a reinsurance 
market for incumbent and new carriers to distribute such risks and perhaps a prearranged 
arbitration board between carriers and customers to address issues of implementation 
while avoiding the courts. 
Related Pricing Issues 
In developing economic models for the telecommunications industry, the 
CommAspen program should consider the distinction between business and residential 
customers. While in 2000 there were twice as many residential loops (phone lines) as 
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commercial loops, there were also 50% more toll revenues (for long distance and local) 
from commercial loops than residential loops [1 – Tables 8.4 and 10.3]. 
The telecommunications marketplace is a vital, robust, and dynamic system. Despite 
the financial downturn of the telecommunications industry during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, companies were still making money. The return on investment (ROI) for 
RBOCs and other “price cap” companies varied between 10% and 20% [1 – Table 4.1]. 
Consumers were spending 2.3% of their income on telecommunications, up from 1.9% in 
1980 [1 – Table 3.1]. 
Furthermore, from 1980 to 2000, the costs of the capital components that constitute a 
modern telecommunications infrastructure (fiber optics and processors/computers) 
declined exponentially, and the number of employees declined roughly linearly [1 – 
Chart 5.1,25,26]. This suggests that costs declined faster than the prices actually did, as 
reported in Section 3 of Reference 1 (see also Reference 27). The point being made here 
is that there have been strong inefficiencies in the telecommunications industry due to 
rapid regulatory and technology changes that have slowed the acceleration of price 
reductions to the residential market. Nothing is being said here, however, about the 
commercial market, which has the technological expertise and financial clout to gain 
more significant reductions, especially after the removal of the existing cross-subsidies. 
The bottom line is that the telecommunications market is not such a pure market to 
model.  
Architectures 
To make intelligent modeling decisions regarding the telecommunications market and 
the ability of consumers to make intelligent choices in the model, especially regarding the 
reliability and robustness of services, we need to understand something about the 
equipment architecture for telecommunications services. The infrastructures for the 
architecture of the present are built. Every telecommunications infrastructure is a network 
composed of links (transmission media and systems) and nodes (cross-connect equipment 
between various transmission links), as discussed below. 
The transmission media are of two types: wireline and wireless. Wireline 
transmission media are mainly fiber, with transmission components such as conduit 
media, regeneration sites, multiplexers, analog-to-digital (A/D) converters, and 
distribution nodes. Wireless transmission media are cellular, satellite, and microwave. 
The associated physical plants with these media are cell towers, earth stations, and 
microwave horns, respectively. 
Examples of cross-connect equipment are switches/routers, multiplexers, and 
electrical/optical converters to get from transmission speed/media to switching 
speed/media. Physical structures, like central offices for the telephony infrastructure, 
contain almost all the cross-connect equipment and some of the transmission equipment. 
As such, central offices are the nodes of the network—but not all of the nodes of a 
telecommunications network, depending upon the level of detail one is considering. 
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If we were to summarize the major points of telecommunications developments in the 
1990s, we might say the following: Migration to digital equipment is almost complete 
throughout the United States. Most traffic is serviced with fiber lines, with POTS traffic 
serviced by SS7 networks, with concomitant declines in domestic microwave and 
satellite. Widespread deployment of SONET ring technologies has led to fiber networks 
that are more robust to cuts by backhoes and the like. The migration of traffic through 
leased data centers (“carrier hotels”) exploded during the late 1990s, and cellular traffic 
has continued to grow rapidly. However, the promise of a vital fiber wholesale market 
has collapsed along with most of the new entrants in that market. Competition in the local 
market was enhanced with the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which 
required that the unbundling of service components be offered to competitors at a fair 
price. Yet that has not led to a significant erosion of the RBOC market share. With the 
explosive growth of demand for cheap Internet connectivity by residential and 
commercial customers, ISPs have grown to become an entrenched part of the data 
communications landscape, while other data communications offerings such as frame 
relay and asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) have eroded the demand for conventional 
private-line offerings. Broadband data offerings via cable and wireless, and voice over 
IP, are the new burgeoning areas of communications services. 
How Architecture Is Used 
The logic of how a network operates in the architectures of the present is 
implemented via software. The most complex real-time software is used in switches and 
routers. Software in combination with hardware controls the switches and maintains the 
control data. The roles of people in the architectures of the present are to maintain the 
physical and logical plant and OSS software and processes, including billing, and to 
manually provision services.  
Hardware and software in the architectures of the present digitize and format 
information content at or near the source. Information is converted from analog to digital, 
and formatted for transmission. Either there is already a pre-established connection, a 
connection is established through a switched network in real time, or the network routes 
the packets of information in a dynamic fashion without a formal single connection being 
established [28]. 
Architecture Examples 
There are a vast number of architecture diagrams when you consider a given private 
commercial network or a large carrier’s entire infrastructure. Where, applicable, the 
subsections below give examples of architectures for switched services, private-
line/wholesale services, wireless services, IP/internet services, cable services, application 
services, and satellite broadcast services. 
Plain Old Telephone Service POTS Wireline Service 
Figure 12 illustrates an architecture for the regular phone service with which we are 
all familiar. 
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Figure 12. Example of architecture of POTS. Source: Developed from information in Reference 
29, as well as common knowledge about the industry. 
For a regular phone call, lifting the handset from the phone creates an off-hook 
condition that is detected at the central office. The switch at the central office is now 
expecting to receive dialed digits associated with the phone call. Upon receipt of the 
digits, the SS7 network is queried (represented here by a signal transfer point), and if the 
receiving station is not off-hook or busy, the choice and assignment of trunks is made 
through switches (as represented in the diagram), establishing a route through the 
network. This route may pass through three or more central offices. When the route is 
established, a signal is sent to start the receiving station ringing. Upon the completion of 
the call, one station goes on-hook, and the SS7 frees up the capacity for that call. 
For a private line connection, the connection is permanent, and the customer 
generally handles signaling. The interface to the private line network is made through a 
channel service unit (CSU)/data service unit (DSU), as represented in the diagram. 
In both cases, the signals are multiplexed up to line rates (generally 1–10 Gb/s for 
fiber systems) with multiplex equipment represented in the diagram at the central office, 
and also at the point identified as the digital loop carrier in the diagram. Also when the 
signal is being transmitted at higher bit rates, or when it is still on a metallic carrier near 
the home, the signal can be cross-connected onto other paths via cross-connect 
equipment that is either as simple as a distributing frame or feeder-distribution interface 
(FDI) along the side of a road, or as advanced as a digital cross-connect system (DCS) in 
a central office, as represented in the diagram.  
Plain Old Fiber Transport 
Figure 13 illustrates an architecture for plain old fiber transport.  
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Figure 13. Example of architecture of plain old fiber transport. Source: US West [30]. 
As shown in Figure 13, traffic often must travel from one central office to another 
when the two callers or stations are some distance from one another. Rather than simply 
establishing a single link, which could fail and leave nodes/stations isolated, a “SONET 
ring” architecture like that shown in Figure 14 has been generally deployed, where failure 
of a link on a working path (represented by the red path in this figure) results in an 
immediate switchover of traffic onto a countercyclic backup path (represented by the 
blue path). 
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Figure 14. Example of SONET ring architecture. Source: University of Virginia Computer Science 
[31]. 
Plain Old Cellular Network  
A cellular network is little different from a wireline network, where the wireline 
“loop” media is replaced by a wireless signal. The only difference between the two 
systems is the fact that the wireless loop must be built for each call, in the sense that an 
antenna must be chosen to initiate the call, and that loop must be re-established with a 
new antenna when the caller moves out of range of the original antenna. These call 
ranges are presented by the hexagonal cells in the figure. After the antenna receives the 
signal, it is then generally passed off to the regular wireline network at the mobile 
switching center (MSC) which then transports the call to the receiving wireline station or 
the antenna closest to the receiving wireless station via another MSC. Figure 15 shows 
the architecture of a plain old cellular network. 
 29
 
Figure 15. Example of architecture for plain old cellular network. Source: Periannan and Fahham 
[32]. 
Plain Old IP/Internet  
The Internet is an amorphous, evolving, rapidly growing network tenuously held 
together by a few data transmission protocols (i.e., TCP/IP) that govern the formation of 
packets and their transport through a data network via routers. Figure 16 is the closest 
thing to a representation of the dynamic beast known as the Internet that one can get. 
Because of the lack of obvious hierarchy and structure, graphical maps of the Internet are 
hard to develop and interpret, as witnessed by this graphic.  
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Figure 16. Representation of the Internet. Source: Cheswick and Burch [33]. 
Computers establish connections to ISPs or to gateway points within company 
Intranets, represented by the green and blue nodes at the periphery of Figure 17. These 
ISPs have leased-line access to the nodes of the Internet itself. The Internet is composed 
of a set of backbone data networks owned by various telecommunications companies that 
exchange packet traffic at exchange points or through private peering arrangements. So a 
given packet will leave a computer and pass over a regular phone line, cable link, satellite 
link, cellular link, or leased line to an ISP, which will then pass the traffic over a wireline 
leased line to an Internet backbone network, which may then need to transfer to another, 
or several, backbone networks to get closer to the destination, where the process is 
reversed, passing traffic to another ISP on its way to the destination computer. Some 
organizations can directly terminate their servers on the Internet, bypassing an ISP. 
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Figure 17. Physical layers of the Internet. Source: Russ Haynal [34]. 
Figure 18 shows the protocols of the plain old IP Internet. The protocols are the glue 
that permits diverse packet networks to interoperate in a nonhierarchical but structured 
fashion. The Internet is known as a TCP/IP network, named for the two major protocols 
that govern the construction of packets, and transport of packets through the network, 
(Transmission Control Protocol) TCP and Internet Protocol (IP) [35)]. These are seen in 
the middle layers of the diagram. The lower layers, which correspond to the lower levels 
of the famous Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) seven-level model, address issues of 
physical transport (notice the mention of SONET). The levels above the TCP and IP 
layers correspond to higher levels of the OSI model, addressing application, control and 
monitoring functions. Both the lower and upper layers are outside the purview of what is 
considered “the Internet.”  
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Figure 18. Protocols of the plain old Internet. Source: Internet Technical Resources [36]. 
Plain Old High-Speed Cable 
Figure 19 is a representation of the plain old cable service. A signal is received by an 
earth station or some other head-end facility that is the central point of distribution for a 
metropolitan-area cable system. The plain old cable service is a pure one-way broadband 
broadcast network, laid out as a tree network. Major trunks feed the signal to a set of 
smaller feeder lines each of which feeds a set of drop cables, one per household. This is 
generally a pure analog network. 
 
Figure 19. Representation of plain old cable service. Source: Cable Datacom 
News [37]. 
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Figure 20 represents the two-way enhancement of the cable network, allowing digital 
services such as the Internet and regular phone service to be provisioned over the existing 
cable infrastructure. This generally involves upgrading the trunks and feeder plant to 
digital fiber technology. 
 
Figure 20. Two-way enhancement of cable network. Source: JavaWorld [38]. 
Application Services 
There are no representative architectures for a generic application. It would take a lot 
of effort to develop a categorization of even a small set of applications. 
Satellite and Broadcast Services 
Figure 21 gives a representation of how satellite services are broadcast [39]. 
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Figure 21. How satellite data is broadcast. Source: Remote Satellite Systems 
International [39]. 
Architecture of the Near Future 
Telecommunications can be viewed as an exercise in the digital representation of 
information and in the manipulation and transmission of that digital representation. Very-
large-scale-integration (VLSI) and fiber technologies have enabled these bits to be 
created, manipulated, and transmitted with resources whose costs have declined, and 
whose capabilities have increased, exponentially over the last fifty years. Worse still, for 
the players in the IT marketplace, a bit is a bit is a bit, i.e., a bit lends itself to being 
viewed as a commodity. And it is difficult to make much of a profit selling commodities. 
There are exceptions to commodity transport services, e.g., bits that absolutely positively 
must get there on time, bits that must stay with other bits in a stream, bits that can be 
authenticated as coming in an uncorrupted way from a source. But the majority of traffic 
can be reduced to commodity, low-profit-margin bit transport. As a result, the 1990s 
were a time of migration to digital technologies and a time of major consolidation of 
telecommunications companies [40,41,42]. 
There are a number of future architecture trends, including the following: 
• Digital IP convergence  
• Rapid growth of wireless point-to-point 
• Bridging the “last mile” for residential broadband 
• Migration from private lines to ATM, frame relay 
• Migration to shared “condo space” for equipment 
• Managing the security of IP networks 
Each of these trends is discussed below. 
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Digital IP Convergence 
This trend is much like a bit is a bit is a bit. The ubiquity and popularity of the 
Internet, along with the universal availability of PCs to put data into packets, has led to a 
situation where “a packet is a packet is a packet.” This is not exactly true, however, 
because Internet packet transport is not well-designed for long-distance streaming content 
like video broadcasts. Nonetheless, the exponential improvement in digital technologies 
papers over those few bumps [43]. 
Rapid Growth of Wireless Point-to-Point 
As shown in Figure 22, cellular experienced annual double-digit growth in the late 
1990s and is continuing apace, with Wi-Fi technologies in the early stages of its own 
exponential growth curve [44,45].  
 
 
Figure 22. Subscribers in the United States by type of cellular technology, 1996–
2002. Source: EMC [44]. 
As shown in Figure 23, all wireless technologies experienced double-digit revenue 
growth through the late 1990s and into the new millennium [2]. 
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Figure 23. Projected revenue growth in wireless. Source: 
Telecommunications Industry Association [2]. 
Bridging the “Last Mile” for Residential (and Commercial) Broadband 
Figure 24 shows the relative shares of technologies that provided broadband access to 
residences in June 2000 [1]. Less than 4 million households had access to broadband 
data, as of that date.   
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Figure 24. Shares of technologies providing broadband access, June 
2001. Compiled from Reference 1, Table 2.1. 
Figure 25 shows the estimated growth of broadband access [2]. What is promising is 
that the number of high-speed data lines grew by over 100% in a single year (2000) and 
looks to continue to grow at this rate. 
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Figure 25. Estimated rate of growth of broadband access. 
Source: Telecommunications Industry Association [2]. 
Investment in installing fiber in the access or loop has stalled over recent years. The 
cost of such an undertaking and the technological uncertainties with competing 
technologies such as cable and wireless have slowed progress in achieving a fiberization 
of access for both business and residences. In 2003, only 10% of large businesses are 
connected with fiber [46], while residences are much lower than 1% [47]. Figure 26 
shows the current and projected availability of fiber to residences in North America. 
 
Figure 26. Actual and projected growth of fiber access, 
2001–2004. Source: Render, Vanderslice & Associates as 
extracted from Reference 47. 
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Migration of Private Lines to ATM and Frame Relay 
ATM and frame relay are substitutes for leased lines. As the actual late-1990s data 
show in Figure 27, both ATM and frame relay have grown (as measured by capacity) 
relative to the leased-line market, which shrank during the same period [2]. And those 
trends are projected to continue. 
 
 
Figure 27. Migration of private lines to ATM and frame relay, 1997–
2002. Source: Telecommunications Industry Association [2]. 
Packet transport service offerings like frame relay and ATM will meet the needs for 
subT1 bit transport that were previously met by private line offerings [48,49]. 
Migration to Shared “Condo Space” for Equipment 
The leasing of data centers to support ISPs and other telecommunications companies 
burgeoned in the late 1990s with the dot-com boom, and although it has suffered along 
with the other new entrants in the market in the subsequent bust, there are still many 
millions of square feet of new data center space that have been deployed and used over 
the last 10 years. The latest deployments have been driven by disaster recovery concerns 
following 9/11.  
As a result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, RBOCs are required to lease 
their central office space to potential competitors. This leasing is referred to as 
collocation, but collocation can also mean several ISPs and carriers sharing the same 
leased data center space. The leasing of data center space, or carrier hotels, is viewed as a 
revenue opportunity for the RBOCs. “Vanilla space” charges can be from $15–20 a 
square foot, where the service is bare-bones, offering space and power but little else. Full 
support can cost $200 a square foot [50]. Full support covers the provision of computers, 
SLAs, and perhaps support for software and maintenance. There were 46 million square 
feet of rentable data center space in 2001 [51] with a 40–50% vacancy rate, which 
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prompted consideration of managed hosting [51,52,53]. The space, of course, with the 
additional benefits of managed hosting, would be more expensive. 
Managing the Security of IP Networks 
Even prior to 9/11, IT security was one of the top concerns of IT professionals, and 
that has only grown in recent months [54,55]. In 2001, the biggest worries of IT, as 
reported in Reference 56, were as follows: 
− hackers (25%) 
− network availability/uptime (20%)  
− reliability (12%) 
− network availability/enough bandwidth (5%)  
− keeping up with technology (5%)  
Security was a greater concern than service performance. 
Telecommunications Sector in Overall Economic System 
The telecommunications sector has been moving over the last 20 years into a market-
driven environment, as compared to the quasi-governmental utility role played by the 
single monolithic AT&T. This competitive model for telecom services will only work if 
the underlying market for such equipment and services is a sound and efficient one. 
Unfortunately, the rapid pace of new technologies, combined with the large fixed costs 
associated with some of the investments, e.g., building a fiber network or data center, has 
led to major market instabilities. 
Two prime examples of such technology-driven instabilities have been the rise and 
collapse of the dot-com and new economy companies, whose demand was to pay for the 
dramatic expansion of digital telecommunications networks that occurred in the 1990s, 
and the collapse of the wholesale fiber market and bankruptcy of most of the major 
players in that arena. The dot-com collapse was particularly insidious, because it 
occurred so rapidly that not only did it shrink demand for new equipment, but it also 
provided a ready source of current and second-hand equipment, the combination of which 
multiplied the impact on equipment vendors. The dark fiber that was installed involved 
an expensive capital investment, whose return was contingent on a rapid growth for 
demand in digital services driven by the very new economy concerns that went belly-up 
after 2000. When the demand disappeared, and it was discovered that many players had 
invested in new fiber to meet the same nonexistent demand, the newest of these entrants 
went bankrupt or were bought out [57,58]. For a dissenting opinion, see Reference 59.  
Figure 28 shows the trends in venture capital for telecommunications from the third 
quarter of 1998 through the third quarter of 1999 [2].  
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Figure 28. Investment in telecommunications by venture 
capitalists, 1998–1999. Source: Telecommunications 
Industry Association [2]. 
Between 2000 and 2002, $2 trillion of market valuation was lost in the 
telecommunications sector as evidence that something very bad happened in the market 
[60]. For further reading about the market instabilities that occurred during this period, 
see Reference 61 (summarizes the justification for the investment and the fiber 
hangover). The bath the venture capitalists took is discussed in References 62, 63, and 
64. 
Infrastructure Interdependencies with Communications 
To put the size and scope of the domestic telecommunications infrastructure in 
perspective with the other infrastructures we are concerned with, here are some estimated 
characteristics of the physical plant for telecommunications in the United States generally 
in 2000: 
• There were about 20,000 central offices (derived from information in Reference 
65), with 16,000 RBOC switches [1 – Table 1.1], approximately 1000 switches 
for long-distance companies [66], and perhaps 300,000 vaults and 2 million 
cabinets (derived from information in Reference 65).  
Note: There will be roughly as many central offices as there are switches. Mills 
[67] is cited in References 68 and 69 as assuming approximately 25,000 central 
offices. 
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• There were about 10,000 cell towers [70,71]. Note that this estimate of cell towers 
may be more reflective of 2002 than 2000. 
• There were about 1 million miles of cable plant for the cable industry [72]. 
• There were approximately 200,000 route-miles of fiber in long distance [1]. 
• There were 500,000 sheath-km of fiber in the local carriers’ (RBOC and CLEC) 
networks [1]. 
• There were 5 million sheath-km of copper in the local carriers’ (RBOC and 
CLEC) networks [1]. 
Now let us look at the interdependencies between telecommunications and other 
infrastructures. 
Transportation and Telecommunications 
Telecommunications is somewhat cross-elastic with transportation, especially air 
freight services, for many applications. This is relevant if we wish to explore how critical 
telecommunications services are to the domestic economy. An old saw from 
telecommunications states, “Never underestimate the bandwidth of a semi filled with 
mag tapes.” We can do a quick analysis to flesh out this idea.   
Consider the bandwidth implicit in the nationwide mailing of an AOL ISP service 
disk. Let us assume production and mailing costs of a dollar a disk (probably an 
overestimate) and a mailing to 100 million consumers. A CD-ROM has over 600 
megabytes of storage, and let us assume the mailing travels 500 miles in the United 
States to its destination (assuming two or three different CD-ROM mastering plants—
East Coast, West Coast, and Central). This results in 1020 bit-miles of bandwidth. This is 
not real-time bandwidth, but it could occur relatively quickly. In the case of individual 
users, such a disk could easily be sent overnight. The cost we guess to be $100 million, 
which is significant but probably an overestimate. 
Now consider the entire long-distance voice traffic for the United States. FCC 
(Federal Communications Commission) figures with which we are familiar estimate 300 
billion switched-access seconds for long-distance. We assume an average long-distance 
call travels 1000 miles, and a voice-grade circuit is 64 kb/s. This corresponds to 1019 bit-
miles for the entire year’s long-distance traffic. The revenue from such traffic, again from 
FCC reports, would be $34 billion, on a cost base of $7 billion. Transportation can 
provide 10 times the bandwidth as the entire long-distance POTS traffic, for probably 
two orders of magnitude less money. Now, the important thing to note is that the 
telecommunications traffic is real-time, and the transportation bandwidth is batch. But 
when assessing the impact of a shock to the telecom system on industrial processes, batch 
data transfer via courier and CD-ROMs looks like a competitive and reasonable backup 
option for infrastructure robustness. 
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Electric Power Infrastructure and Telecommunications 
Power Requirements 
The primary critical dependency of the telecommunications infrastructure is on 
electric power. Given this vast infrastructure, power requirements are significant both in 
their sheer amount and extent of their distribution. Quantifying the amount of power used 
by IT has been a surprisingly controversial subject [73]. Estimates have varied over 
orders of magnitude. To get some real sense of power requirements, let us focus on the 
power requirements of the local POTS service. For a given central office, all the 
equipment in total requires 3–5 kA [65]. NEBS standards govern the everyday power 
requirements, interfaces, and limits on central offices and central offices’ equipment. The 
voltage standard for telco equipment in central offices is 48 V [74]. Because power 
interruptions occur, all central offices have uninterrupted power supplies (UPSs), battery, 
and generator backup both on site and available via mobile platform to provide necessary 
power in the event of a power failure. The management of this backup power becomes a 
problem as the total power load of a central office increases. The limits on a building to 
support the sheer weight of a battery bank to back up such a central office, or the danger 
of storing that much diesel fuel for generators, puts operational and practical limits on the 
amount of power a given central office would draw. 
Each subscriber line requires 2–25 W [65]. Depending on the bandwidth requirement 
for the line, a digital subscriber line (DSL) will draw more power than a simple voice-
grade loop. This is the classic relationship between power and bandwidth: the more 
powerful the signal, the more information you can pack into and detect from such a 
signal. According to Reference 66, there were about 200 million subscriber lines in the 
United States in 2000 (RBOC loop plant, effectively voice-grade local phone service). 
Power Backup  
The standard for backup in central offices varies. Eight hours is the standard for 
backup in central offices. Smaller offices take four hours, while remote sites like 
regenerator stations take 24 hours or more. These hourly estimates are based on 
conversations with telco power engineers, as well as References 75, 76, 77, and 78. Most 
telco central offices are wired for external portable-generator hookup, with deployable 
generators on trucks. Wireline has had higher standards than cable, wireless, and ISPs, 
because of the lifeline and 911 availability requirements. Operators of leased data center 
space, who are building their own facilities, are meeting or exceeding the standards set by 
the telcos.  
Power Backup Technologies  
Since telcos are required to provide lifeline and 911 services, they must provide 
backup power at their sites to maintain the availability of such services to the public. 
There are three conventional backup-power technologies: batteries, UPSs (uninterruptible 
power supplies), and diesel generators. Also, there has been some experimentation with 
newer technologies such as flywheels, microturbines, and ultracapacitors. The two 
dominant battery technologies are regular lead-acid batteries and valve-regulated lead 
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acid (VRLA) sealed batteries. The management and maintenance of remote battery banks 
is a problem—these bands are sensitive to their thermal environment, their performance 
degrades over time, they require some level of active maintenance, they vent explosive 
gases and can enter a positive feedback loop known as “thermal runaway” that can 
destroy the batteries. UPSs are battery backup with faster response times, but are 
generally smaller in scope and more expensive. Diesel generators have a slower start-up 
time upon detected failure, have a higher mechanical failure rate and require more 
sophisticated controls and more regular testing, and require on-site storage of a volatile 
fuel on site that itself degrades over time. There has also been some investigation into 
cogeneration at central offices, where a larger generator is collocated with a central office 
or data center and excess power is sold back to the power utilities. With some of the 
newer technologies, people are considering placing the backup power at the residence or 
business.   
For further reading on this topic, see References 75, 79, 80, and 81. 
Cooling Requirements 
If one considers the “footprint”—the square footage required in an office to house a 
particular piece of equipment—the heat density (heat generated per square foot of 
equipment footprint) for current and future generations of computer and data processing 
systems, storage systems, and central office–type telecommunications equipment is 
increasing exponentially, as the performance of semiconductor-based technologies 
increases exponentially (Moore’s law). The same physical size of equipment performs 
exponentially more work, and thus generates roughly exponentially more heat. Increasing 
heat densities, however, are placing increasing demands on facilities to provide sufficient 
mechanisms for cooling the products. Upon moving from many large discrete electronic 
components in computers, switches, etc., in the 1960s and 1970s to the early introduction 
of large-scale-integrated (LSI) and very-large-scale-integrated (VLSI) technology in the 
early 1990s, there was a cooling load reduction. With the continuing shrinkage in 
components and the increase in integration in the early 1990s to the present, there has 
been an increase in cooling requirements as measured by a per-square-foot measure (see 
Figure 31). Figure 29 shows the annual rates of increasing product-footprint heat density 
[83]. 
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Figure 29. Trends in product heat density, 1992–2010. Source: The 
Uptime Institute [83]. 
From an infrastructure standpoint, since more cooling is required, failure in the 
cooling systems, which generally depends upon the water-utility infrastructure could 
become an increasingly more important interdependency. But we really do not know how 
the performance of telco central offices or data centers degrades as the ambient 
temperature.  
Cooling Technologies 
Cooling technologies for equipment in data centers is a difficult topic about which to 
obtain information. Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) is specific to the 
building design of the central office or data center. There are no equipment standards 
driven directly by service availability requirements to be met, just performance standards 
to maintain the proper operating conditions for the equipment. Since chilled water 
systems are the most popular systems in use today, and have been in use for many years 
now, we presume this is the dominant technology. We also speculate that the heat load 
from the very earliest telco electronic technologies was even higher than the load from 
the newest machines is today; thus the older central offices may have oversized chiller 
units relative to the actual load.   
Chiller units often require a significant source of water, which means there could be a 
dependency on the water-utility infrastructure from the telecommunications 
infrastructure. There is generally no backup supply of water maintained by telcos for 
cooling requirements. Water also comes into play in maintaining humidity requirements 
for certain equipment as well. Newer natural-gas-absorption coolers often do not need as 
much water [84]. For general information on chillers, see Reference 85.  
Figure 30 illustrates an example of a process chiller [86].  
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Figure 30. Cooling of a liquid 
passing through a process chiller. 
Source: GCI [86]. 
There is also a good animation in Reference 87.  
As shown in Figure 31, cooling requirements will become more severe [88]. 
 
 
Figure 31. Trends in thermal and circuit technology over several 
decades. Source: Electronics Cooling [88]. 
Labor Needs for Telcos 
Labor needs for a telco relate to transportation, public health and safety, and 
continuity of government. The labor requirements for telcos have been steadily declining 
over the last 20 years, and that decline is even more precipitous if the growth in capacity 
and services is considered [1 – Table and Chart 5.1]. This is a direct consequence of the 
efficiencies provided by automation combined with the deregulation of the industry. 
More interestingly, recent advancements in control systems and management-
information-system (MIS) technologies, combined with the continually increasing 
reliability of equipment, reduce the need to staff many communications facilities. The 
growth of unmanned remote-switching/service nodes is a direct consequence of such a 
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trend. Anecdotally, during a recent earthquake where a major central-office building was 
damaged and no personnel were allowed in, the normal switching and transmission 
services provided by the equipment in the building operated without a glitch (personal 
knowledge). 
Thus, when considering the sort of events that strain infrastructure interdependencies, 
labor needs for a telco are embarrassingly small in the near term. Unless there is a new 
service order, capacity expansion, or repair, the system operates automatically. A general 
caveat can be made: The newer the service, the more handholding is required. There are 
two countermanding trends under those special conditions: special concern for lifeline 
services such as 911, and repair of traffic-dense technologies, such as fibers, that may be 
more likely to fail and must be manually repaired. The trend for greater concentration of 
traffic onto fewer and smaller pieces of equipment means that a single failure can put 
more traffic at risk. The availability of trained technicians and their ability to arrive at the 
scene of a failure becomes more of an issue. This sort of stress is seen during events such 
as hurricanes.  
GIS Information 
Up to this point, we have focused on the conceptual modeling of the processes 
relevant to telecommunications companies. We now turn to the data to support those 
process models. In a deregulated competitive environment, much of the relevant data are 
proprietary and thus unavailable for publication. There are, however, several publicly 
available databases available that describe ROW, buildings, and equipment for the U.S. 
telecommunications infrastructure. The largest and most complete of these databases is 
maintained by Common Language, a subsidiary of Telcordia which was BellCore and, 
previous to that, AT&T. 
Telcordia’s Common Language database [89] provides location codes and 
coordinates for all telecommunications buildings and equipment. This database supports 
operations where telecommunications companies must interoperate and connect 
equipment in the offices of other companies. The underlying databases that provide such 
real-time location information could be used to get a current snapshot of the nodes of the 
U.S. telecommunications network.   
Developed by RDI, TELCOmap [90] is a software product that illustrates the 
convergence between the telecommunications infrastructure and the power infrastructure 
in the United States. With TELCOmap, users can visualize major fiber-optic-backbone 
networks, high-voltage electric transmission lines, natural-gas pipelines, railroads, and 
highways in the same application.  
COFinder [91] is a database application that compiles the wire-center information 
reported to the FCC by the National Exchange Carrier Association [92]. This includes the 
location of central offices, the nature of the carriers using these offices, the NXX 
exchanges served by these offices, and other features available at the switches in these 
offices. 
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Many communications consultants have produced industry survey reports that 
provide more detailed breakdowns of individual technologies and services, usually with 
an eye toward assessing their viability and profitability. These reports often include the 
network maps of individual companies, as well as market-share estimates and growth 
estimates. See References 93 and 94 for a sampling of Web addresses that can be 
accessed to obtain these kinds of reports. 
 
 48
Potential Adaptive Behaviors by Telco Agents in a 
Multiagent Simulation 
Broad Categories of Telco Agents 
We propose four categories for telco agents: wholesale providers, retail providers, 
private networks operated by large commercial customers, and mass-market 
consumers. There is actually a small business market as well, but it fits neatly between 
the categories of private networks and mass-market consumers. Depending on the scope 
of the agent-based model, these four categories would be replicated, with some overlap, 
for local wireline, local wireless, regional, nationwide wireline/fiber, global 
wireline/fiber, and satellite networks.    
The telco market is moving in the direction of a standard wholesale/retail marketing 
scheme. This trend is implicit in the unbundling mandate of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act and in the focus of new congressional legislation. Large 
customers design and manage their own private networks based on the retail and 
wholesale product offerings. The remaining customer base acts like a mass market for 
commodity services, where competition is present.  
Wholesale Providers 
Wholesale providers offer commodity products, e.g., the wholesale business units of 
AT&T and Qwest, and wholesale fiber-optic vendors such as Level 3 and LightCore. 
Thus wholesale providers tend to be more cost-sensitive than retail providers, unless the 
wholesale providers have some monopoly position that allows them to extract monopoly 
rents. The time constant of such a monopoly position would be several months to a 
couple of years in the absence of external governmental restrictions, such as those found 
in local cable systems, for example.  
Wholesale providers also have large initial capital costs that must be recaptured in the 
pricing structure of the services. These capital costs are more sensitive to the cost of 
borrowing money than are the costs in retail markets. On the one hand, it is easier to 
make performance and cost comparisons for wholesale markets than it is to make such 
comparisons for retail markets. In retail markets, it is more likely that unique features 
differentiate services between competitors. On the other hand, there are higher barriers to 
entering the wholesale market, the time to enter the wholesale market is longer, and with 
larger purchases come special contract terms and the ability to add special requirements. 
Wholesale providers work with more technologically sophisticated customer bases than 
do retail providers, and each customer spends more per transaction with wholesale 
providers than with retail providers. These wholesale services influence the quality of 
service of those retail telco customers that use these wholesale services, as well as 
business operations that use those wholesale services directly. 
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The wholesale fiber and broadband market constitutes the vast majority of the 
wholesale telco products. This market is in its early stages, having been in existence for 
less than 10 years. The analogy is often made to the early stages of railroad construction, 
where there was unfettered, and uncoordinated, development of a national infrastructure. 
Since the retail products that expect to use such bandwidth are being developed at the 
same time, there are major revenue uncertainties and fluctuations facing the market. 
Recent scandals of mismanagement and accounting fraud by companies such as Qwest, 
Global Crossing, and Adelphia have also played a major role in the creation of market 
instabilities. Most of the major business collapses in the 2000–2002 time frame have 
been associated with companies that have only a wholesale product line. The 
construction costs and difficulties, though, are much more modest than those faced by the 
rail industry in the early days; and the pace of buildout of fiber is an order of magnitude 
or more quicker than was the pace of railroad expansion. 
Other wholesale markets selling pieces of services are in their infancy, but there is 
little evidence that they will experience the same explosive growth as fiber/broadband. 
For example, the development of a CLEC (competitive local exchange carrier) market, 
which is based upon the purchase of wholesale RBOC (Regional Bell operating 
company) products by CLEC retailers, to compete with established RBOCs has gone so 
slowly that congressional hearings have been held on the matter. 
The other common wholesale situation is for a competitor to receive a quantity 
discount on an entire telecommunications service from a wholesaler, and to add their own 
sales, marketing, and billing to provide services at lower costs. The phone-card market 
for long-distance and international calling follows this pattern. 
Retail Providers 
Retail telco providers sell value-added services to a much broader range of customers 
than do wholesale providers, e.g., the retail business units of AT&T and Qwest, cellular 
providers such as Nextel and Cingular, and cable providers. Retail providers buy their 
bandwidth, connectivity, and perhaps entire services from wholesale providers. It is a 
fairly flat chain, with bandwidth, termination, and connectivity wholesalers selling 
directly to internal and external retailers. Market information, marketing research and 
advertising, plays a much greater role for retail providers than for wholesale providers, 
due to composition of the respective markets. There are many more smaller 
customers/decision makers in retail markets. Each customer influences a tiny amount of 
demand; though even for customers, there clearly are “market leaders” who are more 
influential in the marketplace.   
Each of today’s major telecommunications carriers provides both a wholesale and 
retail product line. In addition, there are a number of niche players who provide only 
retail services, competing on price to a mass market. There is also some movement by a 
few companies to outsource their entire IT (information technology) operations to service 
providers. To the extent that those operations include a large telecommunications 
component, they also provide a significant amount of retail service. 
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Private Networks 
The private networks designed by businesses to meet their own internal needs should 
be viewed as a retail telco operation within the large company itself. Such networks 
operate differently than commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) retail networks. Private 
networks are arguably more responsive to actual customer needs, and more trusted, than 
regular retail offerings. There are fewer people in the chain between revenue producer 
and telco provider, since the provider is the company itself. Those designers and 
provisioners of the private networks are closer to the design and needs of the individual 
business. Often, it is the only way to achieve high-reliability designs based on vendor 
diversity. A large retail vendor will offer a one-stop integrated solution, but one based 
upon its particular infrastructure. To diversify a network across several, hopefully 
diverse, infrastructures, one must use several suppliers, and thus is designing, perhaps by 
default, a private network.     
The more critical IT is to a company, and the more likely IT management is seen as a 
differentiating strength of the company, the more likely the company is to maintain IT 
design and operations in-house, making purchases from both retail and wholesale 
channels. Because these are generally large purchases, a company is likely to have the 
option of negotiating special performance requirements and SLAs (service-level 
agreements) to provide incentives to these retail and wholesale providers to meet 
contracted performance levels. Such private networks are generally higher in cost than a 
single-vendor network solution because of the internal overhead associated with such a 
support function; however, security concerns and accountability within a company often 
make it easy to justify the additional expense.   
Mass-Market Consumers 
For the remaining customer base, which comprises mostly residential and small- to 
medium-sized business customers, a suite of service offerings is made to each household 
or business. These tariff offerings often require regulatory approval at the state level from 
public utility commissions (PUCs). Performance specifications are generally “best 
effort,” with no financial penalties for poor service. In the case of wireless, long-distance, 
and IP services, there is an option to choose alternative service providers, which provides 
a short-term and long-term financial feedback loop between quality of service and 
revenue to the telco provider.   
For those who require wireline local services and cable, there are few, if any, 
alternatives. But technological alternatives (wireless for local wireline, satellite for cable) 
generally are available that meet some fraction of the need. The feedback loop on poor 
performance and high costs for RBOCs and cable is closed at the state-regulation/PUC 
level. If the RBOC or cable company does not provide an adequate quality of service, the 
only recourse a customer has is to complain to the state PUC. There is not an adequate 
feedback loop between the customer base, that is effectively captive, and the revenue 
stream of the telco vendor. 
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Characteristics of Telco Services 
Telecommunications is unique among infrastructures in the wealth of technologies 
and associated service offerings. In today’s digital world, all information, with the 
exception of certain broadcast offerings, is a bit. To move a bit from A to B in the United 
States, we may use a satellite, a cellular phone or terrestrial wireless data network, or a 
wireline connection. The bit may be in a packet or on a channel and most likely will be 
transmitted via a series of individual carriers. The bit may ride a public network or a 
private network; and that network may be a data network, a voice network, or a 
converged voice/data network. The circuit the bit follows may have been constructed just 
for that unique packet, or the channel the bit rides on could have taken weeks to design. 
The reliability and availability of the service on which the bit rides may have been 
enhanced. The bit may even be charged a premium due to the demand present at the time 
and place the transport was initiated. The unit of capacity purchased is normally a 
discrete amount of bandwidth as measured by bits per second, e.g., 64 kb/s (a voice-grade 
circuit), 1.5 Mb/s (a T1 circuit). There may also be some customization of circuit design, 
for example, a teleconference bridge may be provisioned to allow several participants to 
share a single conversation.    
For the purposes of our economics and outage modeling, we recommend reducing the 
list of differentiating characteristics of telco services to cost, bandwidth, time to 
provision, reliability/robustness, and penalties assigned when the service fails. These 
characteristics are discussed below. 
Cost 
Between the regulated and unregulated portions of telecommunications services, 
every sort of pricing structure has been applied to telco products: by time of day, by day 
of week, by the minute, by the mile, by service, etc. All of these pricing structures are in 
place for various sorts of telecommunications service offerings. For example: 
− One-time fee: regular TV, radio broadcasts 
− Per-month fee: plain old local telephone service, integrated services digital 
network (ISDN) service, DSL service, some cellular, ISP/Internet, satellite TV, 
cable TV, microwave, Centrex 
− Per-minute: plain old long-distance service, certain private network services like 
FTS, some cellular services 
− Per-minute, per-mile: plain old international service 
− Per-month, per-mile: private lines, wholesale bandwidth 
− Decreasing marginal prices with volume: wholesale bandwidth, cellular  
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For large customers, special rates are charged for custom private networks. These rates 
can be substantially discounted from public offerings. 
 
The situation becomes much more complicated under unbundling, where each 
element of a local telecommunications service must be made available at a fair 
competitive price to all comers. That is, however, beyond the scope of our study. 
Time To Provision 
There are two flavors of telecommunications service. Some services are provisioned 
nearly instantly, e.g., a POTS (plain old telephone service) call is built and torn down in 
seconds. The other classes of services are custom-engineered. These services normally 
involve special requirements, such as the bridging of several circuits together or the need 
for a large amount of bandwidth.  
Provisioning times are generally five to seven days for most generic services. 
Provisioning of a business service often involves coordination between two or more 
telecommunications companies. Thus the more companies involved, the longer the delay. 
Further, because some areas are still bandwidth-limited, the larger the amount of 
bandwidth requested, the more likely it is that new construction or reconfiguration of 
existing capacity would be needed. In such cases, provisioning times could run into 
weeks or months because they are very location- and service-specific.   
Spikes in activity are particularly hard to assess. Most custom service requires at least 
some manual activity and human involvement. The staffs of technicians at 
telecommunications companies have been sized so carefully since divestiture that they 
can easily become overloaded. Consequently, actions that would take days under normal 
circumstances could take weeks or even months.  
Availability (Outage Minutes, Time To Repair) 
The availability of telecommunications services became a national concern in the 
early 1990s when the implementation of fiber, combined with other stressors on major 
carriers, led to a series of major, long-term service outages. As a result, an industry 
consortium, the Network Reliability Steering Committee (NRSC) managed by the 
Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) [95], collects outage data on 
major circuit-switched failure events and provides regular summary reports to the FCC 
and to the nation. The major categories of failure events are as follows: 
• Fiber cuts 
• Switch failures 
• Signaling failures 
• Power system failures 
• Transmission equipment 
• Traffic overload 
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By root cause, this breakdown becomes the following: 
• Telco equipment 
o Procedural flaw 
o Design flaw 
o Hardware failure 
• External stressor 
o Weather 
o Man-made 
o Cable damage by rodents, soil movement, etc. 
• Building failure 
o Flooding 
o Temperature control failure 
o Fire 
o Corrosion/contamination 
• Traffic/system overload 
o Too much traffic 
o Reduced capacity 
• Power failure 
• Operations support failure 
 
More detailed breakdowns on the observed rates and outage times for circuit-
switched service failures for the last several years can be obtained from the NRSC. There 
is no formal reporting requirement for transmission failures that do not affect circuit-
switched services, e.g., for packet networks like the Internet, for private networks, or for 
cable-based networks. 
Telecommunications is the most robust and self-healing of all the major 
infrastructures. Much of this is due to the ease with which diverse routing schemes can 
reroute traffic and the relatively low cost of provisioning capacity for exploring such 
restoration schemes. Compared to the electric power infrastructure, the 
telecommunications infrastructure has implemented more sophisticated automated 
algorithms and has a lower downside risk if such schemes fail, i.e., no equipment can be 
damaged if an automated scheme fails or was poorly designed. 
A failure in a telecommunications network can be restored in as little as 50 
milliseconds (e.g., restoration of a broadband circuit on a protection channel) or as long 
as 24 hours (e.g., the case of the recent AT&T frame relay failure). Most fiber services 
are restored relatively quickly in the event of a fiber failure, but the physical fiber repairs 
themselves normally take several hours. If a building is destroyed, it could take several 
days or weeks to restore fiber service that terminates on that building, although cellular 
service can be used to restore narrowband voice and data more quickly. 
Failure events can be as limited as a single circuit to a single home or as extensive as 
the outage of an entire nationwide network, as in the case of the January 1990 AT&T 
direct-link-node (DLN) failure of the switched network [96]. Generally, a failure affects a 
single service for a single carrier. Since most major carriers now have their own fiber 
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networks, there are few telecom-specific events that would affect multiple carriers. 
Multiple services can be affected, though, on a single carrier if fiber routes or central 
offices or data centers fail. If failures occur outside of the control of telecommunications 
systems, e.g., power failures and civil emergencies, then both multiple services (because 
of the risk to fiber routes and telecommunications buildings) and multiple carriers (which 
share the same power infrastructure) could be affected. 
Based upon those insights, it is clear that there is no generic failure mode for 
telecommunications, nor are there generic impacts from failures. In fact, the most severe 
failures have often been those that are the most exquisitely specific to the particular 
implementation of a particular service.   
On the plus side, restoration options have become much richer for the creative 
telecommunications consumer. There are wireless and wireline options, cable and 
twisted-wire-pair options, satellite and cellular options (and Wi-Fi), circuit and packet 
options, along with several options for broadcast messages. Therefore, it can generally be 
assumed that critical narrowband messages can always be reestablished quickly if 
thought is given beforehand to the kinds of systems in place. 
Another telecommunications advantage to the nation in terms of reliability is the 
competitive availability of parallel physically diverse services on alternative vendor 
networks that can be turned to when a service on a given carrier network fails. The 
migration from one carrier to another has been noted in failures such as the AT&T frame 
relay failure, where customers turned to ISDN options on other carrier networks. For 
certain types of failure modes, e.g., frame relay, options such as ISDN may be available 
almost immediately after the failure. Sometimes, alternative channels require a more 
significant lead-time or a change of content format, e.g., wireless text messages rather 
than voice messages.  
Bandwidth/Congestion 
Another major characteristic that differentiates telecommunications services is the 
amount of bandwidth (bits per second) required for a service and how that service is 
affected by a reduction in provisioned capacity. 
Bandwidth can be purchased as an always-on service between two points. This 
service can be purchased in various capacities: 
• Circuit (56 or 64 kb/s) – a regular voice telephone call 
• T1 (1.5 Mb/s) 
• OC1 (45 Mb/s) 
• OC3, 12, 48, 192 (3xOC1, 12x, 48x, 192x) 
 
One way to meet future bandwidth needs is to lease fibers without the electronics. 
This kind of network solution is referred to as dark fiber. Later, the electronics can be 
added for transport at whatever level is desired. For example, with dense wavelength 
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division multiplexing (DWDM), the carrying capacity of fibers can be increased to 10 
Gb/s and beyond. 
This sort of bulk capacity takes weeks or months to provision. Once an initial 
switched or packet private network is provisioned with bulk capacity in a backbone 
network, then smaller incremental units of capacity can be provisioned much more 
quickly to service new demands on the network. These networks are generally limited to 
T1 levels of capacity, but allow the sort of fast establishment of circuit-level sorts of 
connections on these private networks that are found in public POTS networks, discussed 
below. 
At a microlevel, e.g., an individual 64 kb/s circuit, capacity can be provisioned in 
milliseconds. On a shared public network, a switched circuit is leased for the duration of 
a call on the POTS network. On the Internet, each packet’s worth of capacity is 
independently routed on shared bandwidth. There is no provisioning lead-time, but there 
are also trillions of those packets riding the network and using a slow-to-provision 
switched or packet network. 
Generally, packet networks are more robust to congestion effects and network-
element failures than are switched networks. Reconfiguration can naturally occur at a 
packet level in real time. But packet networks are not designed to carry the sort of 
streaming content streams for which a circuit-switched network is designed. If a voice 
call involves a 56 kb/s stream of data between the same two stations for an hour, there is 
less benefit from routing each individual packet than there is for transmitting a large 
series of small (100 kb) messages between a large set of origin and destination pairs. 
Congestion manifests as a delay in transmission in packet networks, whereas 
congestion is reflected in failed connection attempts in switched networks. In some sense, 
connectivity is never lost in packet networks, but bandwidth is reduced. In circuit 
networks, a station does lose connectivity to large regions of the network, or to the entire 
network, during congestion events.  
Penalties for Noncompliance in Performance (Customers and 
Carriers) 
Since CommAspen is an economics model, feedback processes are important. These 
feedback processes have major problems when service is disrupted, as discussed below.  
First, the only way that carriers can justify investments in new plant is by an increase 
of revenue, short-term or long-term, or by a decrease in costs. If a carrier perceives no 
new revenue from an improvement, there must be an avoidance of costs. The revenue 
impacts of outages on telecommunications customers are generally poorly understood by 
the customers themselves, so there is often little willingness-to-pay on their part—until a 
major event occurs. But, by that time, the capacity and systems are not in place to 
achieve what would be a profitable level of restoration for both customers and carriers. It 
would seem that neither carriers nor customers can properly assess the cost of an outage 
and make informed build and purchase decisions based purely upon a narrow 
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consideration of near-term revenue and costs. Normally, the free market assists by 
making available competitive alternatives, so we would expect new entrants to provision 
new capacity that is physically diverse from existing capacity. But in the case of 
telecommunications, and fiber routes in particular, there is often no economic 
justification for more than one capital investment in, say, a fiber route. There may be 
several telecommunications companies who are competing in that market, but on price 
and availability, and not the availability of diverse routing options, so see no advantage 
from not leasing existing capacity. This is especially true since unbundling regulations 
require incumbent carriers to lease such capacity at a competitive price. 
Second, carriers do not pay a proportionate penalty when their services do not meet 
an availability requirement. Carriers operate under “best effort” terms: If they fail to 
provide service, they may be prohibited from billing for the outage period; however, 
carriers do not feel the economic penalty faced by the customer, who may lose many 
times the billing expense in lost revenues. While there has been some effort made over 
the last few years to develop binding SLAs (service-level agreements) with appropriate 
financial penalties, these agreements have had limited penetration for anything but the 
largest telecommunications customers with the most leverage over a given set of carriers. 
With few consequences for failure to provide service, carriers tend to underinvest in 
robust options for their customers. Carriers do not do not feel their customers’ pain from 
a fragile network, nor do they perceive an enhanced revenue stream from a more 
expensive robust network. 
Consumer Behaviors During Telco Outages 
Two kinds of consumer behaviors are expected during telecommunications outages, 
as described below. 
No Response/Use of Readily Available Alternatives 
In the case of small failures, or for mass-market consumers, there may be no real 
change in how people purchase and exploit telecommunications services. Failures that 
occur in off-hours may not even be noticed, and carriers in scheduling maintenance 
activities during these times exploit this fact.   
Using our four-level market categorization, we offer the following speculations: 
• Mass-market consumers: This will be the expected response for the vast 
majority of users. The new products and services that already are available to 
service this sector provide greater robustness anyway, so consumers, by 
purchasing such services, are fixing their own problem without an explicit 
acknowledgement of the problem. For example, cable Internet provides a second 
line into the residence, making households less affected by interruptions resulting 
from failures in loop lines or central offices. 
 57
• Private networks: If a failure made no substantive impact on business operations 
for anyone in its business sector, it is unlikely that a private network would take 
any action because of that single event. Reconfiguration of private networks is 
costly in many ways, so we would speculate that no one would act unless it was 
clear that revenues were at risk. 
• Retail providers: Unless the failure was modest in its impact, we speculate that it 
would be unlikely that no change would occur in the retail providers, i.e., carriers, 
if the failure was due to any of their suppliers. At the least, a retail provider would 
perform an assessment of its current suppliers and would request compensation in 
the form of a rebate for those hours where service was interrupted. If the failure 
were due to its own actions, a retail provider would assess whether the failure is 
acceptable from a revenue or regulatory standpoint. If the failure affected few 
customers and did not affect E911 or other critical services, the retail provider 
might perform a root-cause analysis but do little else. If the failure reached the 
threshold levels of FCC reporting, we assume the retail provider would meet the 
reporting requirement.    
• Wholesale providers: We assume that the conditions under which a wholesale 
provider would do nothing would be equivalent to those under which a retail 
provider would do nothing. For wholesale providers, we assume the failure would 
need to be much smaller for no actions to occur, since a smaller event leverages 
much more traffic, the customers are more technologically savvy, and, in the 
2001–2002 time frame at least, the competition was fierce with significant 
overcapacity. 
Business-Level Disaster Recovery Options 
Near-term response to massive telecommunications failures falls under the umbrella 
of a disaster recovery plan. For private networks, the disaster recovery plan is part of an 
individual firm’s risk-management approach. There are no standards in any industry that 
specify the elements that must be part of a disaster recovery plan, or even whether an 
emergency disaster recovery plan is needed. There is anecdotal evidence, however, that 
such a plan is crucial to the survival of a company in the event of a long-term collapse of 
IT services, but the full appreciation of those vulnerabilities is not reinforced by 
standards promulgated by insurers who help manage a firm’s risk exposure or by 
government regulators.   
A typical disaster recovery plan for telecommunications does not exist. The elements 
of the plan are in great part determined by what the firm produces. For example, if the 
firm is dependent on a bulk of customer orders over the phone, its disaster recovery plan 
would differ from the plan of a chemical plant or even an emergency response service 
that worries about very few, very time-critical communications. We can, however, make 
two general observations. If such a plan exists, there is usually an option to relocate 
operations to a location whose telecommunications services are relatively independent of 
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the original site. This is an acceptable option if the failure is localized to a small 
geographic region.   
There are also ad hoc approaches that involve obtaining alternative services from the 
same provider, or from other providers in a short (1–2 day) time frame. The availability 
of these options is specific to the private network services and available provider 
capabilities relevant to a specific firm. Normally, a provider is very anxious to maintain a 
relationship with a customer and will work in a cooperative fashion to restore service, or 
provide an alternative, in a timely fashion. The larger the firm’s telecommunications bill, 
the more anxious the incumbent provider is to maintain the firm’s business. 
Impacts of Telco Outages 
Here, we speculate on near- and long-term losses, as well as on concerns for public 
health, security, and safety. 
Loss of Near-term Revenue 
There have been a few consulting studies on the topic of information system outages 
and their financial impact. Since this information is part of any marketing pitch for value-
added high-availability technologies, the essential results of these studies have made their 
way onto the Web. These numbers are the ones bandied about in the trade press, in the 
marketing literature, and occasionally in Senate hearings. 
Let us first make an important caveat: Although credible consulting firms in the 
communications arena (e.g., Gartner) performed these studies, there is no motivation for 
any study to underestimate the outage costs and some strong reasons for these costs to be 
overstated. The costs are used in advocacy or marketing situations to increase 
expenditures on outage-reduction technologies. The companies or external groups paying 
for copies of the studies are the ones who stand to profit financially from increased 
internal or external expenditures. 
The cost of an outage to an industry is specific to the industry in question. A much-
cited high-end figure is $6 million per hour for brokerage services [97] down to $100,000 
per hour for reservation services [98]. A range from $1 million to $3 million per hour is 
quoted for various IT-intensive businesses [99], as shown in Figure 32. A broader survey 
found that one-half of U.S. companies would suffer less than $50,000 loss for an hour 
outage [100]. And a 1992 survey of network managers estimated the loss at $4,000 per 
hour [101]. 
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Figure 32. Average hourly impact on various businesses. Source: 
Meta Group, cited in Reference 99. 
Most of the cost estimates listed below refer to a total failure of the information 
systems supporting a company. If a communications service fails, and the company’s 
information system is designed to be robust to a single-service failure, there is no 
financial impact. 
Another way of assessing the costs of outages, especially long-term outages, is in the 
continued viability of the firm. 
These costs are disproportionately greater than the rebates and compensation paid by 
carriers that cause customers to suffer such outages. About $30 million was paid to 3,000 
MCI customers over a 10-day frame relay outage in the way of compensation [102]. This 
compensation would be less than 1% of the imputed cost of the outage. 
Long-term outages jeopardize business survival. 
For every five companies affected by a very long-term outage, two will not reopen 
their doors, and a third will fail in the subsequent two years [103]. It is claimed that “a 
company that experiences a computer outage lasting more than 10 days will never fully 
recover financially” [104]. According to the National Archives and Records 
Administration, cited in Reference 99, 93% of firms that lose their data center for 10 days 
or more declare bankruptcy in the first year. And 50% of those businesses file for 
bankruptcy immediately [105].  
According to Reference 106, the average company loses 2–3% of its gross sales 
within 10 days after losing its data processing, and critical business functions cannot 
continue for more than 4.8 days without a recovery plan in progress. Half of the 
companies that do not restore their data center to operation within 10 business days never 
fully recover. Ninety-three percent of the companies lacking a recovery plan are out of 
business within five years of a major disaster. 
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 Most of these outage estimates are based on surveys, which reflect 
perceived rather than actual costs. 
Unfortunately, most of these estimates on outage costs are based upon surveys, or 
cursory in-house analyses, and reflect both biases and a lack of quality in the underlying 
analysis. In-house analyses of structured operations that depend heavily on a single IT 
infrastructure probably provide the best estimates. Our cited cost estimates are based 
upon responses to surveys. The respondents most probably provided estimates based on 
informed guesses since in-house assessments are generally considered company-
proprietary.   
The range of estimates suggests that there may be orders of magnitude of error in the 
reported numbers. For example, in Reference 100 by the Eagle Rock Alliance, 20% of 
the respondents said that an eight-hour IT outage would put their company at risk of 
failure. Although there may be a few ultrahigh-reliability applications that could not 
accept such a risk, they are very few. For a continuous manufacturing process, a pure 
eight-hour outage during a year constitutes a 0.1% reduction in production. Assuming a 
restart time of 16 hours, this would still be a 0.3% reduction in production. And this does 
not even consider the option of increased inventory, which is reflected as a holding cost 
rather than a revenue reduction. This impact is equivalent to a one-day walkout of staff. It 
is hard to believe a one-day walkout would constitute a threat to the survival of 20% of 
U.S. companies. 
There is no incentive for respondents or survey administrators to underestimate their 
outage costs. There would be every financial, political, and psychological reason to 
overestimate such costs. It is so hard to extract funding for support functions like IT, 
much less funding for IT upgrades when there is no direct revenue enhancement, that any 
case must be stated in the strongest possible terms. The embarrassment suffered by the 
company and its board from a major IT failure will drive senior executives to find some 
way to make a financial case for an iron-plated IT system that does not fail 
catastrophically. So the pressures may be from above to pad such numbers to make any 
business case work. The survey compilers are in the position to make contracting dollars 
by supporting the development and implementation of such successful business cases. 
 Formal published methodologies to assess IT outages have become more 
sophisticated, but the market penetration of such methods in formal 
business planning is unknown. 
The two documents we have that document methodologies to estimate outage costs 
are from IBM [107] and the Gartner Group [108]. 
The IBM document outlines how an IT shop should go about assessing the value of 
availability, which is the complement to the cost of outages. The basic steps are as 
follows: 
 Compile an IT inventory of systems.  
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Note that the IBM document is circa 1990 and refers heavily to centralized 
mainframe functions, IBM’s bread and butter at the time. 
 
 Inventory the user base for each system. 
 
 Assess the revenue and profit value of the IT system by each user.   
 
There is mention of using a marginal analysis that captures the profit per unit after 
fixed costs are recaptured.   
 
For support functions, a replacement cost (how much it would cost to do this 
function without computers) is calculated. This reflects the Zeitgeist in the sense 
that if IBM did not exist, the process would have to be done manually. It was 
before IT outsourcing became popular. 
 
 Assess the service outage costs to the business. 
 
To assess the costs, the method proposes various categories of costs: 
− Direct costs versus indirect costs 
− Tangible costs versus intangible costs 
− Fixed costs versus variable costs (variable = costs that are a function of 
the length of service outage) 
 
 Map the IT systems to user services. 
 
Included is a measure of the level of dependency or criticality. 
 
 Map IT components to IT systems as they provide user services. 
 
 Value IT components in terms of their value to maintaining user services. 
 
This potentially involves capturing the system reliability as it logically depends 
on individual components.   
 
Any quantification is assumed to follow from expert opinion. There is a brief 
description of the Delphi technique as an approach to collect expert opinion. The IBM 
document is supplemented by an Excel spreadsheet. 
The 1998 Gartner Group assessment goes into less formal detail than the IBM 
document but is more sophisticated from an overall “value to the business” sense. The 
costs of outages include revenue impacts, productivity impacts, damage to reputation, 
financial performance, and expenses associated with catching up on lost time. In 
particular: 
 The revenue lost due to outages includes both direct loss and long-term revenue 
loss, such as losses due to delays in billing and losses from investments. 
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 Productivity includes the number of employees times the number of hours 
affected times the burdened hourly rate. 
 
 Damage to reputation includes the damage suffered by customers, who may not 
return to do business, and to suppliers who get reimbursed late, whose pain then 
trickles down to bank and financial partners. 
 
 Financial performance includes revenue lost and contractual compensation 
payments to customers, as well as increased inventory costs, reduced discounts 
from suppliers as a response to paying late, and even stock market performance.  
 
 Catching up may involve overtime to employees, additional shipping costs, 
equipment rental, and litigation. 
 
More specific points from the Gartner study include the following: 
 By the year 2000, it was forecasted that 80% of high-IT-intensity companies and 
40% of low-IT-intensity companies would use intangible costs to assess the cost 
of outages. 
 
This means that including intangible costs in determining IT availability targets, 
although explicitly discussed in the 1990 IBM document, had not become 
universal, even for large companies, by 1998. 
 
 The costs of outages should be lower for those industries that dominate and 
control their market and where the loss of market share should be expected to be 
small in the face of major outages.  
 
 An individual piece of hardware alone is not assigned a specific number that 
reflects its contribution to an outage since the overall system and its design and 
operation are what provide reliable service, not any given box. 
 
 There are second-order costs associated with outages. 
 
Examples of second-order costs are billing losses and compensatory payments 
associated with missing billing or fulfillment targets. 
 
 The time the outage occurs can be crucial. 
 
You should assume the worst possible time for the outage for your calculations. 
 
 There should be some consideration of how critical IT is to employee productivity 
when assessing IT outage costs. 
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If employees can be doing useful work otherwise, that should be credited in some 
ad hoc but quantified fashion. 
 
This is alluded to, but the summary document still uses the full burdened cost of 
an employee to assess productivity impacts. That is, the Gartner Group report 
mentions modifying the full burdened costs, but the IBM report does not. 
 
In both the Gartner Group assessment and the IBM study, the option of telework or 
other work employees can be doing on their local PCs seems to be downplayed. This may 
reflect a research and development (R&D) bias, but few knowledge workers are without 
other work options if the IT system goes down, especially if there are company-secure 
PCs waiting for them at home. Manufacturing and retail may be another issue. We can 
learn from the December 1998 San Francisco power outage and 9/11 events to assess 
whether that is actually true. 
Additionally, selecting the worst outage time for assessment of damages seems to be 
excessive. This could affect outage impacts by factors of 2 to 10 or more for certain 
industries. Those damages seem closer to the costs assessed against a malicious IT 
system attack, which is only a small fraction of the total-outage scenarios. Selecting the 
worst outage time might be further evidence of subtle upward bias in outage costing. 
The Website availability.com has an on-line cost-of-outage calculator [109]. The 
calculator captures revenue and salary costs at risk in a simple calculation. It does include 
a factor that explicitly reflects the percentage of work that cannot be done if a given 
system is down, rather than assuming all work in a department stops. This would allow 
the tool to be used to reflect short-term versus long-term outage costs from the standpoint 
of an increasing fraction of wasted time as workers run out of things to do. 
Loss of Long-term Revenue 
The loss of reputation and associated long-term revenue is even harder to quantify 
than the short-term revenue impacts, whose estimates we mentioned before range over 
five orders of magnitude. There are no well-publicized instances of a carrier going 
bankrupt because of long-term concerns with communications reliability, nor of major IT 
or service companies failing due to a problem with obtaining a reliable 
telecommunications provider. It is difficult to estimate any smaller revenue impacts from 
such events since the time frames involved include many other events that affect 
revenues.   
Public Health, Security, and Safety Concerns 
Public health, security, and safety concerns have been explicitly addressed by the 
NRSC (Network Reliability Steering Committee) in their FCC reporting since its 
inception. The NRSC’s categorization of sensitive locations and functions is probably the 
most sound unclassified characterization available. The data collected by the NRSC does 
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not suggest any unique characteristics of these outages. The outages are also rare, e.g., 
only four events reported in 2001 met NRSC guidelines.   
State PUCs generally require additional detail on any E911 outages in their 
jurisdiction and provide another regulatory feedback loop to the carriers if the rate or 
causes of such outages are deemed unacceptable.  
Characterization of Customer Behaviors after Telco Outages 
There are no academic studies on business and economic behaviors after service 
outages, and there is no academic subdiscipline in economics that focuses on the 
response of economic systems to shocks in the infrastructure. The studies that have been 
done to predict or evaluate the impacts of price shocks on an economic system (a major 
focus of economists over the years) are of little use in identifying the impact of a single 
technology failure. There is no “infrastructure input/output matrix” for modeling the 
impact of infrastructure shortages over various time frames. The technical understanding 
of the impact of past outages would be buried in the corporate history and proprietary 
disaster-recovery plans of industrial sectors that depend on telecommunications, and in 
the proprietary studies that carriers would have done after major events. What little 
information that is available in the trade or popular press is anecdotal, but relevant. 
Based upon our historical understanding of telecommunications and past outage 
events, we will speculate on the likely responses by customers to major outages. Since 
this report spans the period that includes 9/11/01, we will also comment on the customer 
responses as reported in the press. 
Change Network Design 
Wholesale (Broadband) Providers 
Changing a network design, either a wholesale rearchitecture or just the provisioning 
of additional capacity in the face of unexpected user utilization or demands, is a rare but 
normal occurrence in wholesale networks. A wholesale network rearchitecture usually is 
done when a new technology is introduced or upon major changes in strategic marketing. 
Since new technologies have been arriving fast and furiously, changing a network design 
is a continual process, at 5- to 10-year intervals. Even in the face of dramatic technology 
change, e.g., fiber, this process can take a few years. There is a “critical path” for such 
changes: 
1. Changes requiring several years: obtaining ROW, obtaining regulatory approval 
2. Changes requiring a couple of years: next-generation technology improvements, 
feature-set changes within current technological limits 
3. Changes requiring six months to a year: building a new office and installing new 
equipment, coordinating the installation of network capabilities via software 
4. Changes requiring a month: ordering and installing new equipment in an office 
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5. Changes requiring days or a week: major coordinated provisioning of new 
transmission capacity. 
 
With the amount of dark fiber provisioned in the nationwide network, new network 
designs that primarily require new transmission capacity on certain major routes would 
be initiated and could occur in about a one-month time frame. This is not true in many 
metropolitan areas. There is not, though the technology is becoming available for there to 
be, a wireless option at the broadband wholesale level to bridge the gap at metropolitan 
levels. Therefore, for many routes and customers, the redesign option for broadband 
services would not be available in the one-month time frame. Note that narrowband is 
primarily retail and will be discussed in the next subsection. 
With the availability of cybercenters and the unbundling requirements on RBOCS, 
redesign no longer requires the construction of new offices, but simply the ordering, 
installation, and configuration of new equipment. 
Redesign activities probably are a six-month planning activity for any major carrier. 
Determining what to do is likely to take longer than actually doing it.   
Because of the amount of coordination across various carriers required to provide 
new connectivity, the amount of delay is driven by a “weakest link” dynamic. This is 
partly why large customers choose to construct their own networks from wholesale 
components in the first place—to better control the scheduled turn-up of new network 
services by choosing whatever suppliers can deliver a given component of the service in 
the necessary time frame to meet milestones. 
Although wholesale carriers compete, the knowledge of their target architectures can 
probably be gleaned from publicly available records. There is no real advantage gained in 
hiding knowledge of the topology of the network that is designed, or to be provisioned in 
the near term, since that information is needed by the sales staff to market to customers. 
Capacity available on routes, on the other hand, could be of competitive advantage and 
might not be generally advertised. In addition, the actual timing of some deployments and 
full implementations are fundamental unknowns for competitors and for the carrier itself. 
Post-9/11 follow-up: The above was written pre-9/11. The provisioning process 
mentioned above was dramatically accelerated during the days following 9/11, when 2 
million circuits were physically and logically reprovisioned over six days, instead of a 
month. Mobile switching centers and cell towers were temporarily rolled in as well, 
cutting the normal time to install equipment from a month to a couple of days. But the 
observation that the rearchitecture of a network takes months to years was reinforced 
with the announcement of a new robust Securities Industry Automation Corporation 
(SIAC) network (more properly considered a private network, but large enough to fall 
under the wholesale market aegis) to support the 9/11-battered New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), over a year after the 9/11 event.   
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Retail Providers 
Retail networks are characterized by narrowband services with a richer set of 
potential features provided to a broader set of customers than is found in wholesale 
networks. The redesign of retail networks, however, depends upon the availability of 
wholesale network service offerings as one of the production inputs. The planning of a 
retail network redesign must take customer relations and marketing considerations into 
account much more thoroughly than the planning of a wholesale network redesign. 
Because of the richer set of features in retail networks, coordination and testing takes a 
much greater amount of time. On the other hand, there are few, if any, long-lead-time (as 
measured in years) items that must be obtained and provisioned. Because it is not a 
commodity, like wholesale, there are higher profit margins in retail networks, and the 
relative speed with which these networks can be provisioned means that capital to pursue 
such redesign activities should be more widely available. There may be proprietary 
design and technologies associated with such networks, at least more than those 
associated with wholesale networks.  
Post-9/11 follow-up: There were few changes evidenced in retail network design 
after 9/11. The instabilities resulting from the consolidation and convergence trends in 
telecommunications, combined with the collapse in stock prices in telecommunications 
that followed from the dot-com bust in 2001–2002 swamped in magnitude the impact 
from 9/11. Movement towards more robust architectures such as packet was neither 
accelerated nor slowed by the 9/11 event, although certain niche services like video-
teleconferencing and wireless data received a bump. The impact was more directly felt in 
purchases in the same retail services to support new or enhanced disaster-recovery 
options. 
Private Networks 
Private networks are “retail on top of retail.” Everything that distinguishes retail from 
wholesale, when applied to a greater degree, distinguishes private networks from 
wholesale networks: speed, development of customer requirements, highly implicit profit 
margins (as reflected by revenue-at-risk, or new revenue potential), and smaller networks 
with less bandwidth but richer features. Coordination is made more difficult by the 
relative lack of market leverage in purchasing component elements, but made easier by 
the smaller size of such networks. Because there is no governmental oversight, private 
networks can reconfigure faster but have no leverage to enforce standards beyond those 
of caveat emptor, “best effort,” and SLAs.  
The decision-making process for the design of private networks involves executives 
whose expertise is not in IT, and thus you might expect longer redesign implementation 
times than would be found with carriers selling retail services. The richness of the feature 
set makes testing more difficult, but the knowledge of the specific configuration that is to 
be implemented (as contrasted to testing to all possible configurations by retail carriers 
for general service offerings) far offsets the difficulty of testing. The smaller size of the 
network means that performance issues that benefit from economies of scale, such as 
congestion management and spare capacity, are more problematic for private networks. 
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On the other hand, performance issues that suffer from diseconomies of scale, like 
testing, are less problematic for private networks. 
Post-9/11 follow-up: The demand for disaster recovery increased in the post-9/11 
period. There had already been some movement towards treating disaster recovery as a 
requirement for business operations. Failures of large data centers and other crucial 
business sites, both terrorist- and nonterrorist-related, had led businesses to implement 
backup sites and supporting telecommunications infrastructure. Those whose 
telecommunications and business architecture were shown to be deficient during 9/11, 
notably the NYSE, have moved to implement more robust IT architectures.  
Redesign Effects by Technologies and Services 
There are specific details associated with individual technologies and services that are 
relevant to redesign decisions: 
• Wireless options such as cellular and satellite are fundamentally limited by those 
who hold the spectrum. Costs will go up proportional to the number of players 
who believe wireless holds greater promise in their redesign. Management-
control features are more limited for wireless, as is security. Wireless is still 
primarily an option for narrowband and broadcast wideband.  
Post-9/11 follow-up: There was no evidence of an increase in demand for 
wireless solely based on the robustness requirements after 9/11. Wireless is still 
early in its life cycle, and new technologies and spectrum availability are driving 
demand. An emergency in a schoolyard is more important to the mass market as 
availability of communications during a national emergency and is driving 
behaviors. 
• The availability of dark fiber is unevenly distributed throughout the United 
States, with some areas having more spare fiber than others. The robustness of 
well-designed fiber networks is most sensitive to the number of available 
alternative physical routes in an area.  
Post-9/11 follow-up: The availability of dark fiber is proving to be an important 
issue as disaster recovery plans are being implemented and as alternative sites 
demand diverse fiber routings, which are not available in many areas of the 
country.     
• The same lack of even distribution is true for carrier hotels, though to a lesser 
degree. For alternative carriers, there is the option of RBOC central offices. With 
the shrinking of the form factor for telecommunications equipment, there are 
more options to collocate these facilities at customer-premise data centers. This 
leaves the reliability of such networks dependent on the reliability of the support 
services at such premises.   
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Post-9/11 follow-up: There is no evidence of an increase in alternative data 
centers solely due to 9/11. The overbuild of data centers during the dot-com 
boom has left a significant overcapacity that is being drawn down in the post-
9/11 era, and this is the dominant dynamic.  
• Commercial products to provide telecommunications services, both circuit and 
packet, are generally available from a small handful of vendors—both domestic 
and international. Any inventory problems from these vendors would delay 
deployment. This is not true for software, only hardware.  
Post-9/11 follow-up: In the period immediately after 9/11, there were several 
stories of heroic acts by vendors to support customers immediately impacted by 
the events. If the logistics are in place to support the vendors, the vendors will 
sacrifice short-term gain to support the customers if at all possible. Since there 
was a significant inventory of hardware to be made available because of the 
post–dot-com economic environment, the vendors had little problem supporting 
additional customer needs. 
• Personnel issues are probably the most manageable of the issues regarding 
redesign. Professional IT staffs are remarkably flexible in managing to new 
technologies. 
Post-9/11 follow-up: Again, there were heroic stories of how IT centers moved to 
support workers who worked at home during the emergency.  
• Interoperability standards often lag behind the availability of features in new 
hardware releases. The delay in such standards and testing will result in a 
reluctance to use these new features in any future redesign. 
 
Select Higher-Reliability Services 
Wholesale and Retail Providers 
Major carriers offer a spectrum of services with increasing reliability performance. At 
one end, account managers will work with network engineers to customize the design and 
layout of customer services to an engineered standard. This option is more available to 
circuit services than packet at the present time, but it is a focus of ongoing development 
in the packet worlds as well. The primary difficulties are in obtaining such services for 
nonmetropolitan areas and in guaranteeing that designs achieve reliability and maintain 
engineering standards. At the other end, reliability standards vary across generic service 
offerings of various vendors, and it becomes an exercise in shopping around.   
Post-9/11 follow-up: There is also evidence of the metropolitan area itself, and its 
business councils, working to put pressure on the carriers, especially dominant players 
like RBOCs, to make available high-reliability service offerings. This pressure extends to 
the real estate/landlord markets as well, arguing for the need for two diverse entrances 
into buildings for fiber lines. 
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Private Networks 
There is a continuum of management philosophies in managing private networks. At 
one end, a single carrier is chosen to coordinate the design and management of the 
enterprise network. At the other end, the private network is designed from customer-
premise equipment and wholesale bulk transport, all purchased and integrated by the 
customer.  
In the case of the former (a single carrier) philosophy, the decision is at an executive 
level, perhaps even with the board of directors’ approval. Just the threat of such a switch 
can get the attention of a carrier and improve the management of the services to improve 
reliability. The problem is that this costs more, is generally slower to respond to business 
needs, and assumes that the unique performance characteristics of the company’s 
communications network is not a unique differentiator that provides a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace. 
In the case of the latter, the decision involves buying the same generic widget from A 
rather than B. The problem in this case is that no telecommunications widget, short of 
bulk transport, is generic. There is a major price to be paid in testing, evaluation, 
removal, and installation to ensure the device performs as advertised and is integrated 
into the specific private network with all of its quirks. 
Post-9/11 follow-up: One additional feature unique to the telecommunications 
industry that has arisen is the de facto monopoly RBOCs continue to hold in providing 
regional telecommunications services. There is no secondary carrier that private 
networks can turn to if the RBOC in the region does not choose to provide services that 
meet the reliability needs of the customer. The attempt to create a CLEC industry has not 
been particularly successful, while at the same time the regulatory pressures that had 
historically been able to be placed on RBOCs have been weakened. The only fortunate 
event that is partially mitigating this problem is the availability of alternative 
technologies such as cellular and packet. Unfortunately, some of these are early enough 
in their life cycle to lead to trust issues for the private network managers.  
Mass-Market Consumers 
There are many fewer high-reliability offerings available to the mass market, short of 
selecting a more reliable vendor. The information on which to base such a decision is 
scanty and anecdotal, becoming a process limited by the available information and the 
rate at which reliability changes over time for various vendors. History has shown this 
rate to change more quickly for new entrants that are quickly growing their networks and 
facing greater proportional increases in traffic loadings and service churn. There is good 
data on nationwide reliability performance levels over time. One would expect these rates 
to vary across geographic regions for a given vendor. 
The relative shortcoming in service offerings is more critical to small businesses that 
cannot justify the initial and ongoing costs of a private network.   
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Post-9/11 follow-up: The relative shortcoming in service offerings can be seen from 
the relatively slow recovery of approximately 10,000 small businesses after the 9/11 
event. 
Change Vendors, Diversify across Vendors 
Wholesale and Retail Providers 
Changing vendors, or even diversifying across vendors, is difficult for wholesale and 
retail providers. There are a limited number of vendors available for the hardware to 
drive service offerings at the wholesale or retail level. There are no objective measures 
testable by a customer to determine subtle differences in the reliability of such hardware. 
Changing or diversifying hardware vendors means additional investment in support 
systems (software, procedures, etc.). The larger the purchase of equipment from a given 
vendor, the greater leverage a customer has in obtaining information, support, and future 
features. All of this must be balanced against the benefits of protecting the network 
against catastrophic failure from a common-cause failure in a single vendor’s equipment. 
There are ways to minimize such impacts by staging the deployment of new equipment 
so as to see any potential problems only on the fraction of the network on which the new 
devices are deployed. The same argument is true, to a lesser extent, for software support 
systems. 
Ironically, these issues are less true for the vendor relationship where a wholesale 
bandwidth provider offers commodity transport for a retail provider. “A bit is a bit is a 
bit” as the saying goes, and it is easier from an operational viewpoint to change 
wholesale vendors. On the other hand, the geographically uneven availability of 
bandwidth provides fewer vendors from which to select, especially for metropolitan fiber. 
Mass-Market Consumers 
The above issues are less true for mass-market services. Long distance POTS and 
related services are commodities, with easily characterized, and slowly changing, quality 
of service. In this case, it is the sophistication of the customer that is most in question. 
Determining the quality of service of a phone carrier is not everyone’s favorite thing to 
do, even if failure in that service potentially affects the quality of life of the customer 
more than he might first imagine. But the price of diversification is trivial with the 
availability of phone cards and equal access to alternative vendors via 1-0-NXX carrier 
select codes. The same argument is true for satellite broadcast, ISPs, and cellular carriers. 
The lack of alternative vendors in the local market makes the question of vendor 
diversity moot. This lack of competition for the local market POTS is an acknowledged 
problem at the federal level and was the target of legislation in 1996 to reduce the 
barriers to entry for new entrants into the local market. It is also true for cable services, 
which provide the only meaningful near-term wireline alternatives to RBOCs in the local 
loop. On the other hand, wireless services provide a technologically diverse POTS-
equivalent service offering for the local markets. 
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Private Networks 
There is little difference in the problems faced by private network designers and retail 
telco marketers when diversifying across vendors. In both cases, the number of 
meaningful options and the operational cost of diversification are large enough to create a 
significant barrier-to-entry for other vendors. This is somewhat lessened when vendor 
diversity is designed up-front into the original design. The engineering costs in making 
mistakes in diversifying are smaller for most private networks, but the revenue impacts 
are greater. This means that provisioning parallel vendor-diverse networks is more 
feasible and desirable for private networks than for retail networks. 
Change Communications Technologies 
Wholesale Providers 
The migration of domestic communications from satellite and microwave to fiber was 
driven by service quality and marginal cost concerns and has taken well over a decade to 
occur in both long-distance and local markets. Any technology changes would be an 
acceleration or deceleration of future potential trends; firms would not go back to satellite 
for Continental United States (CONUS) communications, for example. Any migration to 
a broadband wireless option (e.g., some sort of adaptive 802.11b or ultrawideband 
[UWB] networking for technology diversity) would take at least as long. The other 
technology option for wholesale would be a layer 2/3 technology like IP-on-fiber or 
Gigabit Ethernet, which would also be a several-year undertaking.   
Post-9/11 follow-up: The above speculation seems to be proven post-9/11. There has 
been no clamoring for a new Internet or accelerated implementation of satellite phones, 
or any other technology, outside of proven normal business needs. The lessons of 9/11, as 
reflected in changes in the IT investment strategy of the United States, focus on increased 
concerns over security, rather than robustness. But this was already a leading interest 
for IT even before 9/11, as a result of a series of well-publicized cracker attacks. 
Retail Providers 
The migration to IP-based services from circuit-switched, and from wireless to 
wireline, would be the major technology moves expected for retail. Again, this would be 
acceleration or deceleration of current trends. 
Private Networks 
We would expect private networks to more quickly take advantage of technology 
change, since this would involve new purchases rather than new technology 
development. If a new technology would provide enhanced value after some major event 
or change, the adoption of such a technology would be accelerated. Again, it would 
follow the natural trajectory of technology advances: moves to all-optical, wireless over 
wireline, packet over circuit.   
Post-9/11 follow-up: The development and deployment of a more robust private 
network to support the NYSE and associated brokerage houses within a year of the 9/11 
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aftermath is an example of such a response. The peak in demand for videoconferencing 
observed in the weeks and months after 9/11 are a nearer-term example. This latter trend 
has continued to be observed after events such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) outbreaks [110]. 
Mass-Market Consumers 
The accelerated use of new technologies would also be expected by the mass market. 
For example, after a disaster like the World Trade Center, cellular or broadband wireless 
services might be in greater demand by those whose wireline services were cut. It is 
unclear whether the inertia from the sheer size of the consumer market would make new 
technology adoption slower than would the integration requirements of a commercial 
private network. Equipment and bandwidth shortages are more likely if the mass market 
tries to quickly adopt, as compared to the commercial sector.  
Change Business Processes To Be Less Sensitive to Service 
Outages 
Wholesale and Retail Providers 
There is little opportunity to apply this sort of business-process re-engineering 
approach when your revenue stream comes directly from offering communications 
services. The only real option from a business standpoint would be diversification of the 
corporation outside of telecommunications services. This is a real option, though, if the 
long-term view suggests that reliable communications are more difficult to provide and 
higher in cost. That is unlikely to be the case under small, marginal changes in network 
reliability. 
Mass-Market Consumers 
The ability of the “average consumer” to change his or her lifestyle to be less 
sensitive to communications services is dependent upon the consumer’s particular 
lifestyle. A telecommuter with a Small office Home office (SoHo) is probably more 
dependent than a retired couple on communications services, although the Internet may 
provide the latter with a wealth of entertainment options. The question is the need for 
immediate information updates by the average consumer. There are enough broadcast, 
cable, and CD/VHS/DVD entertainment options to keep most consumers entertained. 
And with the wealth of technology options available, even residential customers have a 
choice of cellular voice, cellular data, the Internet, even satellite voice, in addition to just 
POTS. So it is unlikely any major lifestyle changes, other than buying such technologies, 
would be pursued. 
But industries that operate on fast production cycles, as well as social and family 
networks that need to be maintained, often require the consumer to have access to 
immediate point-to-point information for which there are no alternatives to modern 
communications technology. Air-freight services, carrier services, and mail services 
provide a competitive alternative for the distribution of information in one to three days 
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and can cover a significant part of the demand, albeit in a less efficient way. Fortunately, 
there are so many point-to-point options available (cellular, wireline and Internet, even 
satellite, along with creative uses of broadcast media) that the likelihood such options 
must be pursued would be vanishingly small, even during localized major events like the 
World Trade Center during 9/11. 
Private Network Designs 
This is the area where alternatives to reliability communications are the most likely to 
be found. Since communications performance has improved so dramatically over the last 
couple of decades or more, the trend has been to exploit these exponential improvements 
to make business processes more dependent on reliable communications. There is 
probably a division that can be made between those industries that are dependent upon 
communications for their revenue and those industries that are less dependent. 
There is no practical way to use existing microeconomics models to determine this 
sort of partition. Common-sense understanding of the nature of the business and the 
engineering issues underlying it can probably provide such a first-order partition. But 
there must be some creativity applied in the analysis. For example, consider national TV 
broadcast channels. If they only distributed information to local broadcasters via fiber 
links and those fiber links failed, one would assume a short-term loss in revenues. But in 
the mid- and long-term, producing DVDs that contain the content that would normally be 
broadcast, combined with a mail service and consumer availability of DVD units, would 
allow equivalent consumer access to the entertainment and perhaps even enhanced 
revenues to the distribution channels.  
Post-9/11 follow-up: An additional complication occurred during 9/11 that limits the 
re-engineering of business processes to make them more robust to telecommunications 
failures. There was a major shutdown of air traffic during the aftermath of 9/11 that, 
combined with greatly reduced demand in the weeks and months following the event, 
limited the ability to substitute air passenger travel and freight for telecommunications. 
Telco Behaviors after Telco Outages 
The threshold that must be exceeded before telecommunications firms react to an 
individual outage event is much higher than the threshold that exists for consumers. First, 
telecommunications networks have a greater and more carefully provisioned robustness 
to outages; therefore, a better restoration process is in place for telecommunications 
networks than for most services. Second, whereas many customers can simply change 
carriers, a telecommunications carrier’s response is to re-engineer a system, which is a 
much larger undertaking. And third, the inertia to improve system robustness is 
exacerbated by the relative lack of financial penalties felt by carriers that provide less 
than stellar service to customers. Financial penalties for poor service simply do not exist 
for any but the very largest consumers of telecommunications services. Thus it takes a 
demonstrated loss of long-term revenue to occur, e.g., after a large number of customers 
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leave a carrier, before any significant engineering improvements could be justified 
economically. 
In the months following 9/11, security concerns have led to a reduction of 
information that is publicly available about individual telecommunications network 
improvements stimulated by those events, so we will not be able to comment on long-
term carrier responses to 9/11. 
Diversify Equipment, Routing, Etc. 
This sort of action is normally stimulated by the availability of new technologies 
more than by economic advantages to the carriers. Often, customers undervalue 
reliability and robustness until an event occurs, so enhanced revenues cannot be used to 
justify the deployment of robust technologies. When a major failure occurs, that changes, 
at least for the customers affected.   
The greatest challenge to providing diverse services is in the deployment of a suite of 
fiber routes rich enough to support diverse routing at a metropolitan level and in those 
more sparsely populated portions of the country. As mentioned previously, building these 
routes has a high initial cost and lead times of many months to a few years. 
Choose Alternative Suppliers or Diversify Supplier Base 
Changing suppliers is a larger decision with a longer lead time for 
telecommunications firms than it is for consumers. Often, price breaks are given to large 
purchasers of equipment of a single vendor’s equipment or services. Also, operations and 
training costs increase dramatically with the introduction of a new supplier’s products. 
This is a strategic IT decision and, as such, has long lead times on the order of months or 
years. The smaller the company, the faster such decisions are generally made. If, for 
example, a frame relay network goes down, companies have turned to alternative 
suppliers to provision ISDN lines in a matter of hours or days. 
Design New Restoration Schemes 
There has been no known case of a new restoration scheme being developed in the 
near term as a response to a major outage. Such schemes require a few years of planning 
and implementation, usually including new hardware and software features, before they 
are introduced. 
Offer New Robust Services 
These services can be implemented on an ad hoc basis relatively quickly (weeks to 
months) for large customer networks if there is evidence that there is a public health and 
safety concern or if there is a threat the customers will take their business elsewhere. 
Carrier-wide service offerings involve longer lead times (months to years) to ensure that 
general availability and proper pricing are offered. Maintaining the robustness of those 
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services is often a sticking point, with limited assurance that a service that, say, provides 
a diverse routing will maintain that diversity as the network changes over time.   
Offer Financial Rebates 
There is often an offer after a major outage not to bill customers for the amount of 
time the service was actually not provided. This is small comfort for most large 
customers, as well as some smaller ones, who either lose revenue or an ability to respond 
to some local event that far exceeds the prorated cost of the service. Although the cost 
estimates of outages cited previously vary over a wide range, it is clear that for some 
industries the lost revenue under any interpretation exceeds costs by orders of magnitude. 
Some SLAs over the last few years have started including financial penalties 
proportionate to the financial damages suffered by the customer. These have been 
successfully negotiated by the largest customers first, but are trickling down to some 
smaller customers as well. There are few figures available on the penetration of SLAs in 
the marketplace, but these agreements are growing. The lack of a clear linkage between 
the quality of service provided by carriers and the financial penalties the customer base 
experiences as a result of the provided quality of service is probably the major problem 
facing any economic model of the telecommunications sector modeling the impact of 
outages. 
New Entrants and Technologies To Improve Reliability 
This issue warrants a paper all on its own. The collapse of the vast majority of new 
start-ups that were stimulated by the success of the Internet, both the dot-coms and the 
carriers that were hoping to carry all that new Internet traffic, and the vendors selling 
equipment to those new carriers have been the subject of several recent books. The 
telecommunications industry is in a consolidation-and-convergence mode, and new start-
ups will be hard-pressed to obtain the venture capital and customer base to ensure their 
continued survival. Thus we probably cannot count on the availability of new start-ups to 
offer options for relieving major quality-of-service concerns such as reliability. Even 
CLECs continue to struggle, and they have received major stimulus from the government 
and only attempt to compete on POTS traffic. Combined with the lack of appropriate 
feedback on the quality of service of today’s large carriers, this suggests a potential 
problem that could lead to service degradation over time with little an individual 
customer can do to address the issue. 
There are rays of hope. One is the fact that many, if not most, new technologies are 
inherently more robust, e.g., packet, or can be made so with modest incremental 
investments, e.g., incremental bandwidth on fiber for diverse routing or restoration 
capabilities, cellular services as a cheap and widely available backup to wireline voice 
service. And as the costs of these technologies follow Moore’s law, especially wireless, 
the simple option of purchasing two technology-diverse options becomes more 
acceptable. This argues that technology policy, rather than economic policy, still 
dominates the dynamics of sector changes in telecommunications.  
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In spite of the above argument that suggests more robust telecommunications service 
options will naturally evolve from current technology trends, meeting stringent reliability 
standards will still be a practical challenge in the foreseeable future 
• for high-bit rate connectivity (OC-3 and above) where there are no alternative 
diverse fiber-routing options available and little economic incentive for carriers 
to provide such, and 
• where ultrahigh reliability standards must be maintained for services dependent 
on multiple suppliers, many of which do not have the proper economic incentives 
to meet required reliability standards. 
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